“Red Flag” Laws: How Law Enforcement’s Controversial New Tool to Reduce Mass Shootings Fits Within Current Second Amendment Jurisprudence by Gay, Coleman
Boston College Law Review 
Volume 61 Issue 4 Article 6 
4-30-2020 
“Red Flag” Laws: How Law Enforcement’s Controversial New Tool 
to Reduce Mass Shootings Fits Within Current Second 
Amendment Jurisprudence 
Coleman Gay 
Boston College Law School, coleman.gay@bc.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, Legal History Commons, 
Second Amendment Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Coleman Gay, “Red Flag” Laws: How Law Enforcement’s Controversial New Tool to Reduce Mass 
Shootings Fits Within Current Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 61 B.C.L. Rev. 1491 (2020), 
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol61/iss4/6 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College 
Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu. 
  1491 
“RED FLAG” LAWS: HOW LAW 
ENFORCEMENT’S CONTROVERSIAL NEW 
TOOL TO REDUCE MASS SHOOTINGS FITS 
WITHIN CURRENT SECOND AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Abstract: In the face of increased gun violence and mass shootings in the United 
States, so-called “red flag” laws have become a new and popular tool for protect-
ing public safety. The laws are gaining momentum in state houses around the 
country because they provide law enforcement with a means to expeditiously re-
move firearms from potentially dangerous individuals—regardless of the indi-
vidual’s criminal record and mental health history. Thus far, the laws are a mag-
net for constitutional challenges—including claims that the laws violate the Sec-
ond Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This Note provides a historical and le-
gal background of red flag laws in four states—Connecticut, Indiana, California, 
and Florida—and briefly examines the surrounding case law in those states. It 
then explains the analytical framework that federal circuit courts use to analyze 
Second Amendment challenges to regulations restricting firearm possession. It 
proceeds to discuss how federal courts apply that legal framework to laws that—
like red flag laws—prohibit or restrict the possession of firearms by individuals 
deemed “dangerous” by society. It concludes by arguing that courts considering a 
Second Amendment challenge to a red flag law should find that the law regulates 
conduct and individuals protected by the Second Amendment, and then evaluate 
the law under a test of intermediate scrutiny. 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 14, 2018, a gunman opened fire at Marjory Stoneman Doug-
las High School in Parkland, Florida, killing seventeen students and staff 
members and injuring seventeen others.1 Not long after the shooting, law en-
forcement apprehended nineteen-year-old former student Nikolas Cruz, who 
confessed to the shooting.2 In the days following the tragedy, news reports re-
vealed that what is typical of mass shooters was also true of Cruz: he had dis-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Audra D.S. Burch & Patricia Mazzei, Death Toll Is at 17 and Could Rise in Florida School Shoot-
ing, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/14/us/parkland-school-shooting.html 
[https://perma.cc/UT7X-AGXZ]; David Fleshler, Named for the First Time: All 17 Who Survived Niko-
las Cruz’s Bullets, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/fl-
florida-school-shooting-wounded-list-20180307-story.html [https://perma.cc/7LDM-3BXG]. 
 2 Florida School Shooting Suspect Hid Among Students After Massacre, CBS NEWS (Feb. 20, 
2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/parkland-florida-shooting-nikolas-cruz-continued-coverage-
2018-02-15-live-updates/ [https://perma.cc/ZBP8-G8R9]. 
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played multiple signs of mental health issues, instability, and a desire to harm 
others using firearms.3 Those close to Cruz repeatedly reported warning signs 
to law enforcement.4 Despite the warning signs, local law enforcement offi-
cials took no action to remove Cruz’s firearms from his possession or prevent 
him from purchasing firearms in the future because they did not believe Cruz 
had committed a crime.5 
Only weeks after the Parkland shooting, in nearby Orange County, Flori-
da, University of Central Florida student Christian Velasquez caught law en-
forcement’s attention.6 On a reddit.com page, he referred to Nikolas Cruz and 
Stephen Paddock—perpetrator of the mass shooting in Las Vegas that led to 
the death of fifty-eight people—as heroes.7 In a subsequent interview with law 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Mark Berman, Red Flags. Warnings. Cries for Help. How a System Built to Stop the Parkland 
School Shooter Repeatedly Broke Down, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/national/red-flags-warnings-cries-for-help-how-a-system-built-to-stop-the-parkland-school-
shooter-broke-down/2018/02/23/3ccff52c-18d9-11e8-b681-2d4d462a1921_story.html?utm_term=.
1e388b83573f [https://perma.cc/2PJ8-ZRP4]. A recent study suggests that 42% of shooters displayed 
“warning signs or concerning behavior” to family members before perpetrating their respective 
crimes. BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, HOW EXTREME RISK LAWS WORK TO SAVE 
LIVES, https://brady-static.s3.amazonaws.com/extremeriskfactsheet_Jan2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W97W-LQNC]. In addition, thirty-eight out of the sixty-two mass shooters in the last twenty years 
reportedly exhibited mental health issues before perpetrating the shooting. Mark Folman, Mass Shoot-
ings: Maybe What We Need Is Better Mental Health Policy, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 9, 2012), https://
www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/11/jared-loughner-mass-shootings-mental-illness/ [https://perma.
cc/8GRY-R2V7]. A FBI study of the pre-attack behaviors of active shooters between 2000 and 2013 
found that the average shooter engaged in four to five instances of concerning conduct. JAMES SILVER 
ET AL., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, A STUDY OF THE PRE-ATTACK BEHAVIORS OF ACTIVE 
SHOOTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2018), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/pre-attack-behaviors-
of-active-shooters-in-us-2000-2013.pdf/view [https://perma.cc/2HJD-PC8K]. 
 4 Berman, supra note 3. In the days and weeks before the shooting, the FBI received two anonymous 
tips regarding Cruz’s behavior. Paula McMahon & Brittany Wallman, How the FBI Botched Tips About 
the Parkland School Shooter, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/
local/broward/parkland/florida-school-shooting/fl-florida-school-shooting-fbi-tips-problems-20180828-
story.html [https://perma.cc/PXV3-VA4U]. First, from a YouTube user who noticed another user with 
the screen name “nikolas cruz” had written, “I’m going to be a professional school shooter.” Id. Sec-
ond, from a long-time friend of the Cruz family who expressed her concern that Cruz was going to 
“explode” and “get into a school and just shoot the place up.” Id. In addition, local law enforcement 
received twenty-three calls about Cruz’s behavior between 2008 and the shooting, including one from 
a caller who alerted the Broward County Sheriff’s Office that Cruz was amassing weapons—possibly 
to perpetrate a school shooting—and was liable to commit suicide. Berman, supra note 3. 
 5 See Charles Rabin & Jay Weaver, In Wake of Parkland Massacre, Police Chiefs—Again—Call 
for Assault-Weapons Ban, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/
local/article201002389.html [https://perma.cc/YL3X-8ZWB] (statement of Broward County Sheriff 
Scott Israel) (“Based on the law, if someone [who has weapons] says I want to grow up and be a serial 
killer, there’s nothing you can do about it . . . . We can’t arrest for something a person is thinking 
about.”). 
 6 Krista Torralva, UCF Student Who Idolized Mass Shooters Online Can Buy Guns, Judge De-
cides, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/os-
hearing-risk-protection-order-velasquez-20180402-story.html [https://perma.cc/J7G6-CNXT]. 
 7 Id. 
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enforcement, Velasquez answered a set of hypothetical questions by saying if 
he were to commit a mass shooting, he would likely do so where he had been 
bullied in the past: at the local middle or high school.8 By this time, however, 
Florida law enforcement possessed a statutory tool that allowed it to act on 
these warning signs.9 On March 16, 2018, Orlando police served Velasquez 
with a temporary ex parte risk protection order, which authorized them to 
search Velasquez’s home, seize any firearms he possessed, and prevent Ve-
lasquez from purchasing any firearm for the duration of the order.10 
In an effort to thwart tragedies like the Parkland shooting, more and more 
states are turning to the type of law used by Florida law enforcement in the 
Velasquez case.11 The purpose behind these laws—commonly known as “red 
flag” laws—has largely been to reduce the prevalence of what has become one 
                                                                                                                           
 8 Id. Velasquez also stated, “I can’t imagine myself ever doing that. It would take a lot to push me 
over the edge.” Id. 
 9 See FLA. STAT. § 790.401 (2018) (providing for risk protection orders, which allow law enforce-
ment to seize (and prevent future purchases of) firearms from an individual found to pose “a signifi-
cant danger of causing personal injury” to themselves or others via a firearm). 
 10 Temporary Ex Parte Risk Protection Order, City of Orlando v. Christian Velasquez, No. 2018-
DR-3425-O (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 2018); see Torralva, supra note 6 (noting that a Florida Circuit judge 
granted the order filed by Orlando city attorneys).  
 11 See Ryan J. Foley, Gun-seizure Laws Grow in Popularity Since Parkland Shooting, ASSOCIAT-
ED PRESS (Feb. 10, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/3d5722abc06245b4b931933f253e3743 [https://
perma.cc/PJD5-M4CS]; see also Sean Campbell et al., Red Flag Laws: Where the Bills Stand in Each 
State, THE TRACE (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.thetrace.org/2018/03/red-flag-laws-pending-bills-
tracker-nra/ [https://perma.cc/28D9-99DZ]. In the wake of the Parkland shooting, twelve states and 
the District of Columbia enacted red flag laws. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14.5-101 (2019); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit 10 § 7701 (2018); D.C. CODE § 7-2510.01 (2019); FLA. STAT. § 790.401 (2018); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 134-61 (2019); ch. 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 67/35 (West 2019); MD. CODE ANN. PUB. 
SAFETY § 5-604 (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131R (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.560 
(2019); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:58-20 (2018); Extreme Risk Firearm Protection Order Act, S. 5, 2020 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2020) N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6340 (MCKINNEY 2019); 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.3-2 
(2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4054 (2018). In twenty-three additional states, red flag laws are either 
pending or have been rejected. Campbell et al., supra. Five states had red flag laws on the books be-
fore the Parkland shooting. CAL. PENAL CODE § 18150 (West 2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-38c 
(West 2020); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-14-2 (West 2020); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.527 (West 2020); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.94.030 (West 2020). At the federal level, Representative Salud Carbajal 
(CA-24) proposed legislation that would incentivize states to pass red flag laws by providing funding 
for those that do. Lindsey McPherson, Democrats Push Bill They Say Could Have Prevented Park-
land Shooting, ROLL CALL (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/democrats-push-
bill-say-prevented-parkland-shooting [https://perma.cc/9YZ7-PGBU]. Senators Richard Blumenthal 
(CT) and Lindsey Graham (SC) have proposed similar legislation. Kristina Peterson, Senate Panel 
Considers ‘Red Flag’ Gun Laws in Aftermath of Mass Shootings, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2019), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/senate-panel-considers-red-flag-gun-laws-in-aftermath-of-mass-shootings-
11553601603 [https://perma.cc/JC6R-7ETF]. President Donald Trump has publicly supported state 
red flag laws and their companion federal legislation. Jordain Carney, Graham to Offer Bipartisan 
‘Red Flag’ Bill with Trump’s Support, THE HILL (Aug. 5, 2019), https://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/
senate/456205-graham-to-offer-bipartisan-red-flag-bill-with-trumps-support [https://perma.cc/6J8S-
LX7U]. 
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of the nation’s most serious threats to public safety: mass shootings.12 While 
homicide rates in the United States are generally decreasing, incidents of mass 
shootings are steadily increasing.13 Since 2011, the frequency of mass shoot-
ings—defined by the FBI as shootings resulting in four or more fatalities—has 
tripled.14 In 2019, there were thirty-six mass shootings, up from twenty-six in 
2018.15 Over fifty people died in U.S. mass shooting incidents in August of 
2019 alone.16 
Though red flag laws differ slightly from state to state—both in nomen-
clature and in substance—they all create a mechanism by which law enforce-
ment can petition a court for an order restricting an individual’s access to 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See Matt Vasilogambros, After Parkland, States Pass 50 New Gun-control Laws, PEW CHARI-
TABLE TR. (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/
2018/08/02/after-parkland-states-pass-50-new-gun-control-laws [https://perma.cc/JY9J-UAM3] (cit-
ing mass shootings as the impetus for states’ enacting red flag laws). Law enforcement experts con-
sider mass shootings to be one of the most serious threats to public safety in the United States. See, 
e.g., Meghan Keneally, Mass Shootings ‘Increasing’ and Pose ‘Most Serious Threat’ in US, Expert 
Says, ABC NEWS (Nov. 8, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/US/mass-shootings-increasing-pose-threat-
us-expert/story?id=59056868 [https://perma.cc/Q5XD-3W7D] (quoting former acting Department of 
Homeland Security undersecretary Jerry Cohen); Matt Zapotosky et al., Barr Fields Questions on 
Mueller Probe, Independence from Trump at Attorney General Confirmation Hearing, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/barr-confirmation-hearing-
trumps-attorney-general-nominee-likely-to-face-tough-questioning-today-from-senate-panel/2019/
01/15/02467a16-15e0-11e9-803c-4ef28312c8b9_story.html?utm_term=.ea3780b8a4de [https://perma.
cc/2P6A-WWTG] (quoting U.S. Attorney General William Barr as calling gun violence the “problem 
of our time”).  
 13 Philip Bump, The Frequency of High-Fatality Mass Shootings Has Increased Significantly, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/11/08/frequency-high-
fatality-mass-shootings-has-increased-significantly/?utm_term=.f1c4cd22f1d6 [https://perma.cc/Z9DS-
DWXC]. U.S. mass shootings over the past decade occur three times as often as during prior periods. 
See Amy P. Cohen et al., Rate of Mass Shootings Has Tripled Since 2011, Harvard Research Shows, 
MOTHER JONES (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/10/mass-shootings-
increasing-harvard-research/ [https://perma.cc/4V8B-LNRR] (finding that the average number of days 
separating mass shooting occurrences went from two hundred between 1983 and 2011 to sixty-four 
since 2011). This trend is occurring even though the U.S. gun homicide rate has decreased by half in 
the past twenty-five years. D’VERA COHN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., GUN HOMICIDE RATE DOWN 
49% SINCE 1993 PEAK; PUBLIC UNAWARE 1 (2013). 
 14 BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS UNIT, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, SERIAL MURDER: MULTI-
DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES FOR INVESTIGATORS 7 (2005), https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/
publications/serial-murder#two [https://perma.cc/6XSU-7LTN]; Cohen et al., supra note 13. 
 15 Mass Shootings in 2019, GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE, https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/reports/
mass-shooting?page=12&year=2019 [https://perma.cc/6EWS-NV3E]. The year 2017 saw the highest 
annual total of gun deaths in the United States since 1968. Sarah Mervosh, Nearly 40,000 People Died 
from Guns in U.S. Last Year, Highest in 50 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/12/18/us/gun-deaths.html [https://perma.cc/27VH-XMX5]. 
 16 Neil Vigdor, 53 People Died in Mass Shootings in August Alone in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/us/us-mass-shootings.html [https://perma.cc/NAT2-
A9LQ]. 
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guns.17 Most importantly, red flag laws apply to individuals deemed at risk of 
causing some future harm.18 
Red flag laws are not without their critics.19 All red flag laws authorize 
law enforcement to seize an individual’s firearms temporarily before affording 
any type of notice or due process.20 Some contain broad terms and elements—
like “threat,” “mental illness,” and “near future”—that are vague or unde-
                                                                                                                           
 17 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 18150 (providing that law enforcement or an “immediate family 
member” may file initial petition for seizure of an individual’s firearms); 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.3-2) 
(allowing law enforcement to file initial petition for seizure of an individual’s firearms); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 13, § 4054 (requiring the state’s attorney’s office or state attorney general to file initial peti-
tion). 
 18 See Nathalie Baptiste, What You Need to Know About Red Flag Gun Laws, MOTHER JONES 
(Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/03/what-you-need-to-know-about-red-
flag-gun-laws/ [https://perma.cc/9WC4-GBHB] (stating that red flag laws allow a judge to issue an 
order permitting law enforcement to confiscate firearms from individuals deemed a threat to them-
selves or others). Red flag laws do not require an individual to be a felon or have been adjudicated 
mentally ill or involuntarily committed. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY § 5-604 (containing no 
requirement of official determination of mental illness or felony record); 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.3-5 
(same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4054 (same). 
 19 See ACLU OF R.I., AN ANALYSIS OF 18-H 7688 AND 18-S 2492, RELATING TO EXTREME RISK 
PROTECTION ORDERS 3 (2018), http://riaclu.org/images/uploads/180302_analysis_RedFlagsLegislation.
pdf [https://perma.cc/VT9M-U9EP] (pointing out several constitutional issues and vagueness prob-
lems with Rhode Island’s proposed red flag law); Jim DeMint, Opinion, Red Flag Laws to Fight Mass 
Shootings? Fine for an Ideal World, but We Don’t Live in One, USA TODAY (Sept. 9, 2019), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/09/09/red-flag-laws-mass-shootings-government-power-grab-
jim-demint-column/2220820001/ [https://perma.cc/3CTE-CXB8] (arguing that red flag laws sound 
good in theory, but in practice trample individuals’ due process rights and could lead to government 
overreach); Jessica Lipscomb, Florida’s Post-Parkland “Red Flag” Law Has Taken Guns from Doz-
ens of Dangerous People, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.miaminewtimes.com/
content/printView/10602359 [https://perma.cc/5YZA-9PX4] (explaining gun rights advocacy group 
Florida Carry’s opposition to Florida’s red flag law); Joe Seyton, Hundreds of Floridians Ordered to 
Surrender Guns Thanks to ‘Red Flag’ Law, Report Says, REASON (July 31, 2018), https://reason.com/
blog/2018/07/31/hundreds-of-floridians-ordered-to-surren [https://perma.cc/96ZP-L27Z] (detailing 
concerns of the Cato Institute). The National Rifle Association of America (NRA) initially opposed 
red flag laws; it then announced its qualified support for the laws. Emergency Risk Protection Orders 
(ERPOs), NRA-ILA (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.nraila.org/get-the-facts/emergency-risk-protection-
orders-erpos/ [https://perma.cc/3Q4Z-EJTA]. However, the NRA has worked behind the scenes to 
sink legislative proposals in some state houses. See, e.g., James Pindell, Unlike Many Gun Measures, 
‘Red Flag’ Laws Are Actually Passing. It Looks Like Mass. Will Be Next, BOS. GLOBE (May 24, 
2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/05/24/unlike-many-gun-measures-red-flag-laws-
are-actually-passing-looks-likes-mass-will-next/hSHxHWx0vckxMwr0rv7FEO/story.html [https://
perma.cc/RT2K-4BWE] (detailing the NRA’s opposition to Massachusetts’s red flag law); Alex Ya-
blon, First, the NRA Watered Down a Red Flag Bill. Then It Mobilized to Kill It., THE TRACE (July 
12, 2018), https://www.thetrace.org/2018/07/red-flag-laws-pennsylvania-nra-stephens/ [https://perma.
cc/4MFT-Y8RV] (detailing the NRA’s opposition to Pennsylvania’s red flag law). 
 20 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 790.401 (authorizing law enforcement to temporarily confiscate an indi-
vidual’s firearms if a judge at an ex parte hearing finds the individual poses a danger to self or others); 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.527 (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4054 (not requiring any notice to 
individual before law enforcement conducts a search); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.94.030 (same as 
Vermont). 
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fined.21 Many contain no guidance on procedural minutiae that can bear heavi-
ly on the disposition of a proceeding, such as which code of procedure applies, 
whether hearsay evidence is admissible, and whether judges can grant continu-
ances.22 To be sure, the red flag law landscape seems fertile for lawsuits and 
constitutional challenges.23 
Critics have also speculated that red flag laws may violate individuals’ 
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.24 Two state courts have con-
sidered such challenges and both upheld the respective laws.25 In 2016, in 
Hope v. State, the Appellate Court of Connecticut held that the red flag law did 
                                                                                                                           
 21 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 790.401 (not defining the terms “acts or threats of violence,” “seriously 
mentally ill” or “near future”); 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.3-2 (not defining the term “significant danger,” 
despite ACLU of Rhode Island’s complaints that the term could be construed by a judge to be satis-
fied solely because the individual owns a firearm); ACLU OF R.I., supra note 19, at 6. 
 22 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-38c (containing no guidance on any procedural rules); 
FLA. STAT. § 790.401 (same); 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.3-2 (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4054 
(same); Amended Initial Brief of Appellant at 1, Davis v. Gilchrest Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 280 So. 3d 
524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (No. 1D18-3938) (observing that Florida’s red flag law is problematic 
in part because it became effective so quickly that law enforcement agencies, court clerks, and judges 
had no time to train or prepare for how to properly implement and uniformly apply the statute). 
 23 See, e.g., Hope v. State, 133 A.3d 519, 524 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016) (addressing a Second 
Amendment constitutional challenge to Connecticut’s red flag law); Davis, 280 So. 3d at 528 (consid-
ering void for vagueness, due process, and Second Amendment challenges to Florida’s red flag law); 
Redington v. State, 992 N.E.2d 823, 835 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (considering challenges that the Indiana 
red flag law is void for vagueness and violates the state constitution’s Second Amendment analogue); 
Algernon D’Ammassa, One Thing These Two New Mexico Sheriffs Agree On: ‘Red Flag’ Law Will 
End Up in Court, LAS CRUCES SUN-NEWS (Mar. 1, 2020), https://www.lcsun-news.com/story/news/
2020/03/01/new-mexico-red-flag-law-challenged-sheriffs-gov-lujan-grisham/4823861002/ [https://
perma.cc/NU94-QS4F] (describing New Mexico sheriffs’ opposition to the state’s red flag law); 
Marty Johnson, Conservative Group Sues Over Nevada’s ‘Red Flag’ Gun Law, THE HILL (Dec. 5, 
2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/473267-conservative-group-sues-over-nevada-red-
flag-gun-law [https://perma.cc/TF87-K73Q] (describing a lawsuit brought in Nevada arguing Neva-
da’s red flag law violates the federal and Nevada constitutional rights to a jury trial). 
 24 See Tom Brewer, Red Flag Law a Bad Idea, RAPID CITY J. (Jan. 27, 2019), https://rapid
cityjournal.com/community/chadron/opinion/red-flag-law-a-bad-idea/article_0347a199-140d-5fd0-
ac71-ea12b2c91ed1.html [https://perma.cc/G3PA-FPHT] (voicing opposition as a Nebraska state 
senator); Michael Hammond, Opinion, Kafkaesque ‘Red Flag Laws’ Strip Gun Owners of Their Con-
stitutional Rights, USA TODAY (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/04/
19/red-flag-laws-strip-gun-rights-violate-constitution-column/526221002 [https://perma.cc/S7K7-
GEDB]; Gregg Re, Colorado Enacts ‘Red Flag’ Law to Seize Guns from Those Deemed Dangerous, 
Prompting Backlash, FOX NEWS (Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/sheriff-fires-
back-after-colorado-enacts-red-flag-law-to-seize-guns-from-individuals-deemed-dangerous [https://
perma.cc/6649-63LJ] (explaining how half of Colorado’s sixty-four counties have passed resolutions 
declaring themselves “Second Amendment sanctuaries” opposed to the state’s red flag law); Answers 
to Questions for the Record Posed to U.S. Attorney General Nominee William Barr Following the 
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, at 12 (Jan 27, 2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/Barr%20Responses%20to%20QFRs.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XLD-QWR2] (including ques-
tioning from U.S. Senator John Cornyn (TX) about whether red flag laws infringe upon Second 
Amendment rights). 
 25 Hope, 133 A.3d at 524–25; Redington, 992 N.E.2d at 833–35. 
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not implicate the Second Amendment and ended its inquiry there.26 In 2013, in 
Redington v. State, the Indiana Court of Appeals evaluated a Second Amend-
ment challenge under rational basis review and concluded the red flag law was 
constitutional.27 This Note will evaluate those decisions within the current fed-
eral Second Amendment framework and suggest a different approach to con-
sidering facial and as-applied challenges to red flag laws.28 
Part I of this Note provides a historical and legal background of red flag 
laws in four states—Connecticut, Indiana, California, and Florida—and exam-
ines the relevant case law in those states.29 Part II explains the framework un-
der which federal courts analyze Second Amendment challenges.30 Part III dis-
cusses how federal courts have applied that framework to laws that prohibit or 
restrict the possession of firearms by individuals that society has deemed dan-
gerous, and then discusses the two aforementioned state court decisions in 
light of this framework.31 Part IV argues that courts considering a Second 
Amendment challenge to a red flag law should proceed with the analysis by 
finding that the law regulates individual conduct protected by the Second 
Amendment and should ultimately draw intermediate scrutiny.32 
I. RED FLAG LAWS’ HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In 2008, in its first meaningful foray into a Second Amendment question 
since 1939, the Supreme Court held in District of Columbia v. Heller that the 
Second Amendment guarantees an individual’s fundamental right to keep and 
bear arms for self-defense in the home.33 Two years later, in McDonald v. City 
of Chicago, the Court affirmed its ruling in Heller and incorporated the Second 
Amendment against the states.34 Since these two landmark cases, laws aimed 
at reducing gun violence are predominately limited to preventing dangerous 
people from having guns.35 As a result, red flag laws have become a popular 
                                                                                                                           
 26 133 A.3d at 524–25. 
 27 992 N.E.2d at 833–35. 
 28 See infra notes 151–247 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 33–114 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 115–150 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 151–212 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 213–247 and accompanying text. 
 33 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). The Second Amendment states in its entirety: “A well regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, 
shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II. The Court had not meaningfully examined the Second 
Amendment since its decision seventy years prior in United States v. Miller. 307 U.S. 174, 183 
(1939); see Linda Greenhouse, Justices Rule for Individual Gun Rights, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/27/washington/27scotuscnd.html [https://perma.cc/NSG3-R522]. 
 34 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
 35 See Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Gun Violence, Mental Illness, and Laws That Prohibit Gun 
Possession: Evidence from Two Florida Counties, 35 HEALTH AFF. 1067, 1068 (2016) (explaining 
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approach among commentators because they allow law enforcement to remove 
firearms from individuals who have not been convicted of a crime and may not 
meet the criteria for involuntary psychiatric commitment.36 Some red flag law 
proponents advocate for them because they take a symptom-based, behavioral 
approach to regulating possession and purchase of firearms instead of a diag-
nosis-based categorical approach.37 Section A of this Part details the history, 
statutory construction, and case law surrounding Connecticut’s red flag law.38 
Section B discusses Indiana’s red flag law.39 Section C examines California’s 
red flag law.40 Section D considers Florida’s red flag law.41 
                                                                                                                           
that, since Heller and McDonald, “the role of law is limited in preventing gun violence mainly to 
keeping guns out of the hands of dangerous individuals”). 
 36 See, e.g., Kelly Roskam, The Gun Violence Restraining Order: An Opportunity for Common 
Ground in the Gun Violence Debate, 34 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 1, 22 (2015) (expressing support for 
red flag laws); Frederick Vars, Symptom-Based Gun Control, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1633, 1643 (2014) (ap-
provingly discussing Indiana’s red flag law); Roxana Rudolph, Note, Balancing Public Safety with the 
Rights of the Mentally Ill: The Benefit of Behavioral Approach in Reducing Gun Violence in Tennessee, 
45 U. MEM. L. REV. 671, 685–687, 709 (2015) (arguing in favor of a behavioral approach and citing 
Indiana’s red flag law as a positive example); Editorial Board, Opinion, There’s Something States Can 
Do About Gun Violence: ‘Red-flag’ Laws, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/theres-something-states-can-do-about-gun-violence-red-flag-laws/2018/03/01/22ddf
06c-1cc4-11e8-ae5a-16e60e4605f3_story.html?utm_term=.a5c3ee8f75ce [https://perma.cc/66CV-
DB9G] (advocating for red flag laws as sensible solutions to gun violence at the state level); David 
French, A Gun-Control Measure Conservatives Should Consider, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 16, 2018), https://
www.nationalreview.com/2018/02/gun-control-republicans-consider-grvo/ [https://perma.cc/4NTC-
JTML] (discussing why red flag laws are a sensible approach that respect due process and the Second 
Amendment). 
 37 See Vars, supra note 36, at 1639–42 (presenting an empirical argument for the behavioral ap-
proach and discussing Indiana’s red flag law); Rudolph, supra note 36, at 685–87 (arguing for the 
behavioral approach instead of the categorical approach). Statutes based on the behavioral approach 
allow for a holistic examination of the behavior of an individual and consider violent actions or mental 
health issues when assessing whether to disqualify someone from possessing or purchasing firearms. 
Emily Wajert, Note, Navigating the Rights of the Mentally Ill and Second Amendment: Defining Re-
sponsibility, Balancing Safety, and Weighing Constitutional Rights, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 731, 742–43 
(2015). In a categorical model, those determined by mental health professionals to have a diagnosis 
classified as dangerous are then categorically prohibited from possessing or purchasing firearms. Id. 
Critics of the categorical approach argue that the mental health diagnoses that such statutes typically 
rely on are frequently not trustworthy, and, moreover, are not accurate predictors of whether the pa-
tient will engage in violent behavior in the future. Id. at 742. In fact, studies continuously show that 
patients with mental disorders are not more violent, unless they are using drugs, in which case their 
propensity for violence increases significantly. See Marie E. Rueve & Randon S. Welton, Violence 
and Mental Illness, 5 PSYCHIATRY 34, 39, 46 (2008) (discussing one study that “discovered that the 
combination of alcoholism and antisocial personality disorder increased the odds of women commit-
ting homicide 40 to 50 fold, while the diagnosis of schizophrenia increased the risk only 5 to 6 fold”). 
 38 See infra notes 42–67 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 68–85 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 86–98 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra notes 99–114 and accompanying text. 
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A. Connecticut: The Nation’s First Red Flag Law 
On March 6, 1998, an employee of the Connecticut Lottery Corporation 
murdered four coworkers with a handgun and a knife before killing himself.42 
The shooter, Matthew Beck, was a troubled individual; police previously had 
been called to his apartment after he allegedly attempted to commit suicide and 
he received treatment for depression.43 In response to the public outcry over 
the shooting, state legislators passed Public Act 99-212, making Connecticut 
the first state to authorize the seizure of firearms from allegedly dangerous in-
dividuals who are not otherwise legally prohibited from purchasing or pos-
sessing firearms.44 
The law was written purposefully to exclude mental illness from the list 
of factors a judge may consider in deciding whether to order the removal of an 
individual’s firearms.45 Instead, the legislative scheme is based solely on an 
assessment of whether an individual poses a risk of imminent personal injury 
to himself or others—regardless of that individual’s mental health history.46 
Despite initial opposition by gun rights advocates and a vigorous debate in the 
Connecticut legislature, the law eventually passed with bipartisan support.47 
Under the statute, a state’s attorney, assistant state’s attorney, or two law 
enforcement officers (petitioner(s)) may submit a complaint under oath to a 
superior court judge alleging there is probable cause to show: (1) the subject of 
the complaint (respondent) poses a risk of imminent harm to himself or others; 
and (2) that the respondent possesses one or more firearms.48 The petitioners 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Jonathan Rabinovitz, Rampage in Connecticut: The Overview; Connecticut Lottery Worker Kills 4 
Bosses, Then Himself, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/07/nyregion/
rampage-connecticut-overview-connecticut-lottery-worker-kills-4-bosses-then.html [https://perma.cc/
V256-H9ST]. 
 43 Id. 
 44 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-38c; Jeffrey Swanson et al., Implementation and Effectiveness of 
Connecticut’s Risk-Based Removal Law: Does It Prevent Suicides?, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 
185 (2015). Lawmakers crafting the legislation were concerned about how to balance the interest of 
identifying potentially dangerous individuals with the interest of maintaining the confidentiality of 
those individuals’ mental health. Swanson et al., supra, at 186. 
 45 Swanson et al., supra note 44, at 186. One initial proposal would have required a mental health 
professional to evaluate the individual before the individual’s firearms could be seized. Id. Lawmakers 
rejected that proposal because they worried it would stigmatize the mentally ill. Id. 
 46 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-38c. Such an approach was deemed less stigmatizing to the mental 
health community. Swanson et al., supra note 44, at 186 n.41. 
 47 See Swanson et al., supra note 44, at 187 n.42 (describing how the legislation eventually gar-
nered support from more conservative lawmakers who had initially opposed the bill). The Connecticut 
House of Representatives approved the legislation 103 to 47, which included a 28–19 vote in favor 
among Republicans. Id. The vote was 29–6 in the Senate, and garnered 11 Republican votes. Id. Still, 
some pro-gun rights legislators were not convinced and remained skeptical of the measure; state rep-
resentative Richard Tulisano suggested that the bill constituted an “invidious encroachment by men of 
zeal, well meaning, but without understanding,” on individual liberties. State v. Avery, 1999 WL 
1207153, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 1999) (citing Tulisano who quoted Justice Brandeis). 
 48 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-38c(a). 
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may only file the complaint after they have conducted an independent investi-
gation to establish that probable cause exists and that there is no reasonable 
alternative to prevent the respondent from causing the imminent harm.49 
In determining whether such probable cause exists, the judge must con-
sider any recent threats, acts of violence, or cruelty to animals by the respond-
ent.50 The judge may also consider: reckless gun use or display; a history of the 
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against other persons; 
prior involuntary psychiatric hospitalization; and illegal use of drugs or alcohol 
abuse.51 The hearing at which the judge makes her initial decision is conducted 
ex parte.52 
If the judge finds probable cause that the respondent poses a risk of im-
minent harm and grants the order (risk warrant), law enforcement may proceed 
to the residence of the respondent and conduct an unannounced search of the 
premises for firearms and ammunition.53 Within fourteen days of the firearm 
removal, the court must hold a second hearing.54 At this second hearing, the 
respondent may present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and the judge 
must determine whether the firearms should be returned to the respondent or 
retained by the state for an additional year.55 
                                                                                                                           
 49 Id. § 29-38c(b). State representative Michael Lawlor explained that an “independent investiga-
tion” should “require the police to go out and talk to other witnesses to find out if, in fact, the allega-
tions [being] made [are] true or can be corroborated in any way. In other words, not to just take the 
word of one individual for it, but to go out and attempt to corroborate it.” Avery, 1999 WL 1207153, 
at *4 (alterations in original). 
 50 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-38c(b). 
 51 Id. 
 52 See id. § 29-38c(c) (preventing the court at which the petition is filed from disclosing any in-
formation in the petition to anyone, including the respondent). 
 53 Id. In practice, law enforcement usually takes the respondent’s guns initially as part of “secur-
ing the scene” and then files the petition for a risk warrant with a judge after the confiscation of fire-
arms. Swanson et al., supra note 44, at 188 n.52. Upon the execution of a risk warrant, law enforce-
ment must also make a decision about what to do with the respondent: arrest if there is evidence of a 
crime; transport to a hospital for a mental health evaluation; or just leave the person alone. Id. at 188. 
Research shows that, in Connecticut, respondents are transferred to the hospital for psychiatric evalua-
tion 55% of the time. Reena Kapoor et al., Resource Document on Risk-Based Gun Removal Laws, 37 
DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 6, 10 (2018). 
 54 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-38c(d). 
 55 Id. At this second hearing, the state must prove by “clear and convincing” evidence that the 
respondent poses an imminent risk of harm. Id. This is a higher standard of proof than the standard at 
the initial ex parte hearing, which is “probable cause.” See id. § 29-38c(b) (listing “clear and convinc-
ing” as the standard instead of “probable cause”). Connecticut courts generally—60% of the time—
find that the state has sustained its burden at this second hearing and order the firearms retained for a 
year. Kapoor et al., supra note 53, at 5. In only 10% of follow-up hearings, Connecticut courts find 
that the state has not sustained its burden and order the firearms returned. Id. The rest of the time, the 
study found that Connecticut courts order the guns destroyed or transferred to an individual known to 
the respondent who can legally possess the firearm. Id. 
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Initially, law enforcement tended not to use the statute.56 Nonetheless, fol-
lowing the mass shooting at Virginia Tech in 2007, the annual number of risk 
warrants granted increased to about one hundred per year.57 Researchers have 
found it difficult, however, to determine the effectiveness of Connecticut’s law 
in preventing mass shootings and whether the law has reduced suicide rates in 
the state.58 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given its age, Connecticut’s red flag law has been 
the subject of the most published court opinions.59 A Connecticut appeals court 
has upheld the constitutionality of the law.60 In 2016, in Hope v. State, the 
plaintiff claimed that the law facially violated the Second Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution.61 After reviewing the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller, 
the Appellate Court of Connecticut rejected the plaintiff’s claim and found that 
the law did not violate the Second Amendment.62 In addition, Connecticut 
courts have attempted to define the “risk of imminent harm” standard required 
for a judge to grant the risk warrant.63 In 2007, in In re Nardelli-Firearm Safety 
                                                                                                                           
 56 Swanson et al., supra note 44, at 189. This may have been due to how much time it takes law 
enforcement to file a complaint for a risk warrant with a superior court judge. Id. 
 57 See id. (constituting a five-fold increase). 
 58 Aaron Kivisto & Peter Phalen, Effects of Risk-Based Firearm Seizure Laws in Connecticut and 
Indiana on Suicide Rates, 1981–2015, 69 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 855, 861 (2018); Swanson et al., supra 
note 44, at 206. Researchers in one study estimate that the law may have prevented 128 firearm sui-
cides between 2007 and 2015. Id. Nonetheless, the study found the law coincided with an estimated 
increase of 140 non-firearm suicides over the same period. Id. 
 59 See, e.g., Hope, 133 A.3d at 519; State v. Reddy, 42 A.3d 406, 409 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012); In 
re Belanger, No. CV17890, 2017 WL 5707658, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2017); State v. Za-
rembski, No. CV13003765S, 2016 WL 6121394, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 14, 2016). 
 60 Hope, 133 A.3d at 519. 
 61 Id. at 524. In Hope, the police were called to the plaintiff’s home to investigate a possible bur-
glary. Id. at 522. After searching the house, they found no intruder or evidence of forced entry. Id. But 
the plaintiff insisted that he heard voices coming from his basement and that unknown individuals 
were attempting to hack into his computer. Id. After the plaintiff’s wife informed police that plaintiff 
had become increasingly agitated and delusional, and that she returned home that night to find him 
with a rifle in his hands, police removed the plaintiff’s firearms from the premises. Id. at 523. Follow-
ing the grant of an initial ex parte risk warrant, the trial court then found by clear and convincing 
evidence the plaintiff posed an imminent risk of harm to himself and others and ordered the firearms 
retained for a year; the plaintiff appealed. Id. 
 62 Id. at 524–25. The court found that the law did not infringe upon the plaintiff’s Second 
Amendment right. Id. See infra notes 203–212 for further discussion of the court’s analysis. 
 63 In re Nardelli-Firearm Safety Hearing, 918 A.2d 1081, 1084 n.3 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007). The 
legislative history behind the law indicates that the question of imminence was of concern to the legis-
lators. Avery, 1999 WL 1207153, at *4 (citing to the legislative record). Specifically, during debate on 
the floor of the Connecticut House of Representatives, state representative Ronald San Angelo indi-
cated, 
[T]he standard is set extremely high. Imminent danger to himself or to others which 
means that he has to be getting ready to either kill himself or to kill somebody else . . . . 
I believe that any reasonable judge in the State of Connecticut will be extremely cau-
tious in putting this provision forward, will look very closely for absolute purposes of 
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Hearing, the Superior Court of Connecticut denied the state’s petition to ex-
tend the risk warrant to a year because the state had not shown that the re-
spondent’s risk of harm to himself or others was imminent.64 Referring to the 
statute’s legislative history, the court concluded that imminent means “any-
where from hours to a few days in time.”65 Connecticut courts have also taken 
a strict approach to the statute’s requirement that the second hearing be held 
fourteen days after the initial removal of the firearms following the ex parte 
hearing.66 In 2012, in State v. Reddy, the Connecticut appeals court denied the 
state’s petition for an extended risk warrant because the state had failed to 
schedule the second hearing within the required fourteen days.67 
B. Indiana: The Jake Laird Law 
In January of 2004, paramedics called Indianapolis police to help them 
with a combative patient.68 Police placed the patient—thirty-three year-old 
Kenneth Anderson—under detention at a local hospital and confiscated a large 
quantity of firearms and ammunition from his residence.69 Upon release from 
the hospital, Anderson sought the return of his firearms; in the absence of any 
legal authority to retain the firearms, police returned them to Anderson in 
March of 2004.70 Only five months later—using one of the guns that had been 
returned to him—Anderson went on a shooting rampage, killing his mother, 
Officer Jake Laird, and injuring four other police officers.71 
The next year, the Indiana General Assembly passed by wide margins a 
red flag law known as the “Jake Laird Law.”72 The law grants two mechanisms 
                                                                                                                           
legislative intent, [and the language] makes it absolutely clear that this is not intended 
to be used very often, but only in very rare extreme situations. 
Id. at *5. 
 64 In re Nardelli-Firearm Safety Hearing, 918 A.2d at 1084. 
 65 Id. at 1084 n.3; see Avery, 1999 WL 1207153, at *4 (discussing Connecticut state senator 
George Jepsen’s statements on the meaning of “imminent”). 
 66 Reddy, 42 A.3d at 413. 
 67 Id.; see also In re Zordan Firearms Safety Hearing, No. CV1814203, 2013 WL 2947311, at *3 
(Conn. Super. Ct. May 23, 2013) (denying the state’s petition for failure to file within the required 
fourteen days). 
 68 Indiana AG Reminds Police, Prosecutors of Law Allowing Officers to Take Guns from ‘Dan-
gerous’ People, CBS4 (Feb. 21, 2018), https://cbs4indy.com/2018/02/21/indiana-ag-reminds-police-
prosecutors-of-law-allowing-officers-to-take-guns-from-dangerous-people/ [https://perma.cc/XV35-
ASKR]. 
 69 Id.; Fatima Hussein & Ryan Martin, Indiana’s ‘Red Flag’ Gun Law Is Getting National Atten-
tion. But Does It Work?, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/
2018/02/22/indianas-red-flag-gun-law-getting-national-attention-but-does-work/355132002/ [https://
perma.cc/2VHE-TNWB]. 
 70 Hussein & Martin, supra note 69. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. The measure was extremely popular in the Indiana General Assembly; the House passed it 
91–0 and the Senate passed it 48–1. Id. 
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by which law enforcement can remove firearms from individuals deemed dan-
gerous: (1) by obtaining a warrant from a judge before the seizure; or (2) 
through a warrantless seizure, followed by the submission of an affidavit of 
cause to be reviewed by a judge.73 
To obtain a warrant, law enforcement must present evidence to support a 
judicial finding that probable cause exists to believe the subject of the warrant 
is “dangerous” and in the possession of a firearm.74 After obtaining the warrant 
and executing the search, law enforcement must file a return with the court 
indicating the warrant was served and detailing what was taken.75 If a police 
officer executes a warrantless firearm search and seizure from an individual 
she believes dangerous, the officer must submit to the judge a written state-
ment describing the basis for the officer’s belief that the individual is danger-
ous.76 If the judge then finds there is probable cause to believe the individual is 
indeed dangerous, the court must order the law enforcement agency to retain 
the firearms.77 
Within fourteen days from documentation of the seizure—made with or 
without a warrant—the court must conduct a hearing to determine whether the 
seized firearm should be returned to the individual or retained by law enforce-
ment.78 At this second hearing, the respondent may present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.79 To retain the respondent’s firearms, the state must prove 
by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is still “dangerous” with-
                                                                                                                           
 73 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-14-2; § 35-47-14-3(a). By providing for a warrantless seizure, Indi-
ana’s red flag differs from Connecticut’s—at least theoretically. Compare id. § 35-47-14-3(a), with 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-38c. In practice, however, Connecticut law enforcement frequently re-
move a respondent’s firearms and file for a risk warrant after the removal. Swanson et al., supra note 
44, at 186.  
 74 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-14-2(3). Under the statute, an individual is “dangerous” if: 
(1) the individual presents an imminent risk of personal injury to the individual or to 
another individual; or 
(2) the individual may present a risk of personal injury to the individual or to another 
individual in the future and the individual: 
 (A) has a mental illness (as defined in IC 12-7-2-130) that may be controlled by 
medication, and has not demonstrated a pattern of voluntarily and consistently taking 
the individual’s medication while not under supervision; or 
 (B) is the subject of documented evidence that would give rise to a reasonable belief 
that the individual has a propensity for violent or emotionally unstable conduct. 
Id. § 35-47-14-1(a). Noteworthy is the statute’s reduced standard for those individuals with both a 
history of mental illness and who have demonstrated a pattern of avoiding taking their medication—
these individuals may be subject to the warrant on a showing that they present a risk of injury to them-
selves or others “in the future,” rather than an “imminent risk” of injury. Id. 
 75 Id. § 35-47-14-4. 
 76 Id. § 35-47-14-3(a). 
 77 Id. § 35-47-14-3(b). If the court finds there is not probable cause to believe the individual is 
dangerous, the court must order the state to return the respondent’s firearms. Id. 
 78 Id. § 35-47-14-5(a). 
 79 Id. § 35-47-14-6(b). 
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in the meaning of the statute.80 Researchers have estimated that Indiana’s red 
flag law has contributed to a 7.5% decrease in firearm suicides in the state 
since it was enacted.81 
Indiana’s red flag law has been the subject of two major decisions by In-
diana courts.82 In 2013, in Redington v. State, the Indiana Court of Appeals 
upheld the state’s red flag law under rational basis review in the face of the 
plaintiff’s challenge under the Indiana state constitution’s Second Amendment 
analogue.83 In 2014, in Rebolledo v. Eden, the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of Indiana found that Indiana’s red flag law does not author-
ize law enforcement to seize firearms from an individual who shares residence 
with a person perceived to be dangerous.84 In so finding, the court also clari-
fied that an individual’s diagnosis of a mental illness does not automatically 
establish that individual as “dangerous” within the statutory definition.85 
C. California: Immediate Family Members as Petitioners 
In April of 2014, Chin Rodger, mother of Elliot Rodger, called her son’s 
therapist and expressed concerns about his welfare.86 The therapist communi-
                                                                                                                           
 80 Id. If the state meets this burden, it may retain the respondent’s firearm(s) until the court orders 
them returned or otherwise disposed of. Id. § 35-47-14-6(b)–(c). After 180 days, the respondent may 
petition the court for a hearing to determine whether he or she is still “dangerous”; if the respondent 
proves by preponderance of the evidence that she is no longer dangerous, the court must order law 
enforcement to return the firearms. Id. § 35-47-14-8(a). This right to bring a reinstatement action is 
another difference between the Indiana and Connecticut laws. Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-14-
8(a), with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-38c. If, however, the respondent fails to meet this burden, the 
respondent may not file a subsequent appeal of the order until at least 180 days after the date on which 
the court denied the first appeal. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-14-8(f). 
 81 Kivisto & Phalen, supra note 58, at 861 (presenting evidence suggesting that the law prevented 
383 firearm suicides in its first ten years, while contributing to forty-four non-firearm suicides). 
 82 Rebolledo v. Eden, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1126 (S.D. Ind. 2014); Redington, 992 N.E.2d at 823. 
 83 992 N.E.2d at 833–35. The plaintiff in Redington was found by police on the third-floor of a 
Bloomington, Indiana parking garage looking through binoculars down on the streets below. Id. at 
825. He was armed with two firearms and had another in his car. Id. at 826. He told police he had 
come to Bloomington to avenge Lauren Spierer—who disappeared in 2011 and is presumed dead by 
law enforcement—and that he was “looking at or for people and at buildings and at lights.” Id. The 
officer who conducted the interview reported that the plaintiff was “very delusional.” Id. at 827. The 
officers executed a warrantless seizure of the plaintiff’s firearms and obtained a risk warrant to search 
his home for additional firearms. Id. The officers then filed a petition for a hearing with the court 
pursuant to § 35-47-14-5. Id. 
 84 12 F. Supp. 3d at 1135–36. 
 85 Id. at 1136. The court explained that petitioners would have to make a showing that the re-
spondent has a mental illness that may be controlled by medication, but has not been voluntarily tak-
ing the medicine. Id. The court also warned that the law does not give officers “carte blanche” to seize 
firearms from anyone they deem to be potentially dangerous. Id. In all circumstances, when executing 
a warrantless seizure, officers must operate with the knowledge that they must then convince a judge 
that probable cause exists to justify the police retaining possession of the firearm. Id. 
 86 Adam Nagourney, Parents’ Nightmare: Futile Race to Stop Killings, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/26/us/parents-nightmare-failed-race-to-stop-killings.html 
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cated Chin’s concerns to law enforcement and officers visited Elliot’s apart-
ment.87 After a brief conversation with Elliot, the officers determined that he 
did not meet the criteria for an emergency involuntary commitment and thus 
had no legal basis to search his apartment or take further action.88 Three weeks 
later, Elliot carried out a mass shooting in Isla Vista, California that left six 
dead and thirteen others wounded.89 
In the months following the Isla Vista shooting, the California State Leg-
islature adopted its own red flag law, which provides for the issuance of “gun 
violence restraining orders” (GVROs).90 GVROs are similar to the risk war-
                                                                                                                           
[https://perma.cc/4T7G-ZC7V]. Chin Rodger had stumbled across several concerning videos posted 
by Elliot to YouTube. Joe Mozingo, Frantic Parents of Shooting Suspect Raced to Isla Vista During 
Rampage, L.A. TIMES (May 25, 2014), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-frantic-parents-
isla-vista-shootings-20140525-story.html [https://perma.cc/S6PE-CLPL]. 
 87 Mozingo, supra note 86. 
 88 See Harold Pollack, Why Law Enforcement Was Powerless to Stop Elliot Rodger from Buying 
Guns, WASH. POST (May 29, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/05/29/
why-law-enforcement-was-powerless-to-stop-elliot-rodger-from-buying-guns/?utm_term=.5a68498
a751a [https://perma.cc/LA67-2HD7] (explaining that Rodger had no criminal background or diagno-
sis of mental illness, and law enforcement did not find him to meet the criteria required for an invol-
untary civil commitment); Face the Nation (CBS television broadcast May 25, 2014), https://www.
cbsnews.com/news/elliot-rodger-long-concealed-mental-health-issues-sheriff-says/ [https://perma.cc/
L36X-LWKF] (featuring Santa Barbara County Sheriff Bill Brown explaining why his deputies did 
not see reason to subject Rodger to involuntary commitment or search his apartment). By the time of 
the apartment visit by law enforcement, Rodger had acquired several firearms and a stockpile of am-
munition. Nagourney, supra note 86. In a manifesto posted online before the shooting, Rodger said of 
the meeting with law enforcement, 
I had the striking and devastating fear that someone had somehow discovered what I 
was planning to do, and reported me for it. If that was the case, the police would have 
searched my room, found all of my guns and weapons, along with my writings about 
what I plan to do with them. 
Holly Yan et al., California Mass Killer Thought Plan Was Over During April Visit by Deputies, CNN 
(May 27, 2014), https://www.cnn.com/2014/05/25/justice/california-shooting-deaths/ [https://perma.
cc/87CU-LL2J]. 
 89 Adam Nagourney, Video Rant, Then Deadly Rampage in California Town, N.Y. TIMES (May 
25, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/us/california-drive-by-shooting.html [https://perma.
cc/63A4-UYNG]. 
 90 CAL. PENAL CODE § 18150. State senator Nancy Skinner’s report of the legislation to the Cali-
fornia Senate Committee on Public Safety included an article detailing the Isla Vista shooting—
strongly suggesting the legislation was passed in direct response to the shooting. NANCY SKINNER, S. 
COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, BILL ANALYSIS OF GUN VIOLENCE RESTRAINING ORDERS, AB 1014, Reg. 
Sess., at S (Cal. 2014), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_1001-1050/ab_1014_cfa_
20140623_104818_sen_comm.html. In addition, in the wake of the shooting, U.S. Senator Dianne 
Feinstein (CA) proposed federal legislation that would provide funding to incentivize states to adopt 
red flag laws after the Isla Vista shooting. Press Release, Senator Dianne Feinstein, Feinstein, Boxer, 
Capps Introduce Bill to Help Families Prevent Gun Violence (June 5, 2014), https://www.feinstein.
senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=3b6bf98e-674f-4529-93c7-4ccc3e83a758 [https://
perma.cc/T8DH-H435]. Skinner’s report to the Committee on Public Safety stated that the proposed 
legislation was modeled on California’s domestic violence restraining order system. SKINNER, supra, 
at R. The report noted that the standard for requesting a gun violence restraining order (GVRO) would 
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rants of Connecticut and Indiana, with one major exception that responded di-
rectly to the circumstances of the Isla Vista shooting: immediate family mem-
bers can file them, in addition to law enforcement.91 
The California statutory scheme provides for three forms of GVROs.92 
The first form is a temporary emergency GVRO that can be sought at any time 
of the day or night but only by a law enforcement officer.93 The second form is 
an ex parte GVRO that can be sought by a law enforcement officer or an im-
mediate family member during normal court hours.94 The third form is a 
GVRO issued after notice and hearing that, if granted by a judge, compels the 
                                                                                                                           
be satisfied by a more “attenuated” showing of future significant risk than would the standard in-
volved in issuing a domestic violence restraining order. Id. at G. In the report, some questions seeking 
to address the law’s constitutionality went unanswered. See id. at H (failing to substantively respond 
to questions such as, “Is the standard ‘significant risk of personal injury to himself, herself, or others’ 
vague?” and, “Is it constitutional to temporarily deprive a person of their Second Amendment rights 
based on a finding that the person poses a ‘significant risk of personal injury to himself, herself, or 
others?’”). 
 91 CAL. PENAL CODE § 18150(a)(1). As defined in the statute, “immediate family member” in-
cludes: spouse, domestic partner, parent, child, any person related by affinity within the second de-
gree, or any other person who regularly resides in the household. Id. § 18150(a)(2) (using the same 
definition of “immediate family member” as CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.4). In 2019, California Gover-
nor Gavin Newsom signed into law a provision that adds employers, co-workers, and some high 
school and college staff to the list of individuals who can seek a GVRO. Bryan Anderson, California 
Employers, Schools Can Now Seek Gun Restraining Orders on ‘Dangerous’ Individuals, SACRAMEN-
TO BEE (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article2359
59727.html [https://perma.cc/UC25-QKVE]. The legislation goes into effect on September 1, 2020. 
Id. 
 92 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 18125 (providing for temporary emergency GVROs); id. § 18150 
(providing for ex parte GVROs); id. § 18170 (providing for a GVRO issued after notice and hearing). 
 93 Id. § 18125; Roskam, supra note 36, at 9. A temporary emergency GVRO may be granted by 
the judge on an ex parte basis if the judge finds there is reasonable cause to believe that the respond-
ent poses an “immediate and present danger of injury to self or others by having a firearm in his or her 
possession and that less restrictive alternatives have been ineffective, inadequate, or inappropriate.” 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 18125(a). The temporary emergency GVRO prohibits the respondent from pos-
sessing or purchasing a firearm and expires twenty-one days after the date the order is issued. Id. 
§ 18125(b). 
 94 CAL. PENAL CODE § 18150(a)(1). A judge may issue an ex parte GVRO if the petitioner 
demonstrates that there is a substantial likelihood that (1) the respondent “poses a significant danger, 
in the near future, of causing personal injury” to the subject of the petition or another “by having in 
[their] custody or control, owning, purchasing, possessing, or receiving a firearm;” and (2) the ex 
parte GVRO “is necessary to prevent personal injury to the subject of the petition or another because 
less restrictive alternatives either have been tried and found to be ineffective, or are inadequate or 
inappropriate for the circumstances.” Id. § 18150(b)(1)–(2). In making that determination, the judge 
must consider: (a) recent threats of violence or acts of violence to himself or others; (b) recent viola-
tions of protective orders; (c) conviction for a violent crime; and (d) pattern of violent acts or threats 
within the last twelve months. Id. § 18155(b)(1). The court may also consider other evidence of an 
increased risk for violence, such as: (a) past acts of brandishing a gun; (b) threatened use or actual use 
of violent force against another; and (c) evidence of recent acquisitions of firearms. Id. § 18155(b)(2). 
As with the temporary emergency GVRO, the ex parte GVRO lasts for twenty-one days, after which a 
judge must either dissolve it or hold a hearing to determine whether it should be extended. Id. 
§ 18165(c).  
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state to retain the respondent’s firearms for one year.95 Though the GVRO 
statute was passed in 2016, news reports and county data suggest it has been 
infrequently used by California law enforcement and prosecutors.96 
No California court has published a decision addressing the constitution-
ality of GVROs, but the California Court of Appeal did consider a Second 
Amendment challenge to a similar statute authorizing law enforcement to seize 
and retain firearms from individuals detained for medical examination under 
the state’s involuntary civil commitment statute.97 California’s Court of Appeal 
held that the law did not violate the Second Amendment because individuals 
whose firearms are seized as a result of their involuntary civil commitment 
under Section 8102 of the California Penal Code fall outside the scope of the 
Second Amendment’s protections.98 
D. Florida: A Quick Response to Parkland 
Florida’s red flag statute was signed into law twenty-three days after the 
Parkland shooting—a testament to the degree of public outrage in a state that 
had not passed a single piece of legislation tightening firearm regulations since 
1996.99 Law enforcement immediately put the red flag law to use.100 In 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Id. § 18170. A judge may issue the GVRO after notice and hearing only if the petitioner has 
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent: (1) poses a significant risk of personal 
injury to himself or another by possessing or purchasing a firearm; and (2) that there are no less re-
strictive alternatives that could mitigate the risk. Id. § 18175(b)(1)–(2). If the GVRO after notice and 
hearing is granted, the respondent has one opportunity within the year to request a hearing to show 
there is no longer clear and convincing evidence to demonstrate that the above two elements are satis-
fied. Id. § 18185(a). 
 96 See Alexei Koseff, ‘Best Tool’ to Prevent Gun Violence Is Rarely Used in California, SACRA-
MENTO BEE (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.sacbee.com/latest-news/article206994229.html [https://
perma.cc/A7L5-3HRX] (citing data to show that as of the end of 2017, judges in twenty-six of Cali-
fornia’s fifty-eight counties had not issued a single GVRO—of any type). 
 97 City of San Diego v. Boggess, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644, 648 (Ct. App. 2013). The challenged 
statute was CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 8102 (West 2020). Id. at 650. California’s involuntary civil 
commitment statute allows the state—upon a showing of probable cause that the individual has a 
mental disorder—to commit such individual to a mental health facility for a seventy-two-hour period 
of evaluation and treatment. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150. 
 98 Boggess, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 653–54. In so holding, the court affirmed its decision in Rupf v. 
Yan, a case that was decided before Heller. Id. (citing 85 Cal. App. 4th 411, 416–417 (2000)). The 
Boggess court examined the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment decisions and concluded, with little 
analysis, that § 8102 was among those “presumptively lawful” categories of regulations listed in Hel-
ler. See id. at 652–53 (explaining that “both Heller and McDonald identified an expressly nonexclu-
sive list of traditional limitations on the right to bear arms, characterizing them as ‘presumptively 
lawful regulatory measures’” and concluding that “Section 8102 . . . is such a regulatory measure”). It 
did not apply the two-step analysis, discussed infra at notes 131–142, that federal courts use to evalu-
ate whether a law passes constitutional muster. See id. 
 99 Lipscomb, supra note 19. The passage of Florida’s red flag law, which was part of a legislative 
package enacting many gun control laws called the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public 
Safety Act, was welcomed as a massive legislative win for gun control advocates in a state historically 
1508 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:1491 
Broward County alone, Florida law enforcement filed 108 petitions under Flor-
ida’s red flag law between March and July of 2018—about three-quarters of 
which were granted.101 An October 2019 news story reported that as many as 
2,500 Floridians have had firearms removed from their possession since the 
law was passed.102 It is perhaps unsurprising that the Supreme Court of Flori-
da, in its request for funding for eight additional trial court judgeships, ex-
plained that the law had significantly increased trial court judges’ respective 
caseloads.103 
The Florida law created two types of “risk protection orders”: temporary 
ex parte risk protection orders and full risk protection orders.104 In general, the 
                                                                                                                           
dominated by the NRA. Id. The package passed in the Florida Senate by a 20–18 margin and the Flor-
ida House by 67–50. Id. 
 100 Id. On March 7, 2018, Broward County police checked on a man whom neighbors had seen 
“clutching at his face” and “talking to himself.” Id. When police spoke with the man, he explained that 
he had been having numerous break-ins, which he blamed on the FBI and his neighbor—who he said 
“looked like Osama bin Laden.” Id. As the man elaborated on how his neighbor could shape-shift and 
change heights, law enforcement spotted two firearms in the residence. Id. The man was involuntarily 
committed for treatment under Florida’s Baker Act. Id. While the Baker Act allows for seizure of 
firearms, firearms must be returned after release from treatment. Id. After the passage of the Marjory 
Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act on March 9, 2018, however, law enforcement was 
able to file a petition with a judge, who agreed that the man’s firearms should be retained for at least a 
year. Id. 
 101 Id. In Florida’s Pinellas County, where the sheriff created a five-officer task force specifically 
devoted to filing risk protection orders, sixty-four of the orders were filed between March and July of 
2018. Katie LaGrone, More Than 450 People in Florida Ordered to Surrender Guns Months After 
New Gun Law Took Effect, ABC-WFTS (July 30, 2018), https://www.abcactionnews.com/news/local-
news/i-team-investigates/more-than-450-people-in-florida-ordered-to-surrender-guns-months-after-
new-gun-law-took-effect [https://perma.cc/C59V-NGKS]. All order requests were granted by Pinellas 
County Circuit Court judges. Id. By comparison, California judges granted 190 GVROs during the 
entirety of 2016 and 2017. Koseff, supra note 96. Nonetheless, Florida is not the most active user of 
red flag laws; in the first three months of Maryland’s red flag law, judges granted 302 orders authoriz-
ing seizures. Luke Broadwater, Sheriff: Maryland’s ‘Red Flag’ Law Prompted Gun Seizures After 
Four ‘Significant Threats’ Against Schools, BALT. SUN (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.baltimoresun.
com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-red-flag-update-20190115-story.html [https://perma.cc/YJ5N-
RAE6]. A final order—authorizing the state to keep the seized firearms for a year—was granted in 
148 of those 302 initial orders. Id. Sheriff Darren Popkin, a leader in the Maryland Sheriffs’ Associa-
tion who helped develop the state’s red flag law, testified before the Maryland House of Delegates 
Judiciary Committee that he believes the state’s law is being used at a higher rate than that of any 
other state. Id. 
 102 Katie Lagrone, Red Flag Law Used Against Young Kids “Shocking,” Says Florida Senator, 
ABC-WFTS (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.abcactionnews.com/news/local-news/i-team-investigates/red-
flag-law-used-against-young-kids-shocking-says-florida-senator. 
 103 See In re Certification of Need for Additional Judges, 260 So. 3d 182, 183–84 (Fla. 2018) (per 
curiam) (stating that about one hundred risk protection order cases per month came before Florida trial 
court judges in 2018). 
 104 FLA. STAT. § 790.401(3)–(4). A judge must grant law enforcement’s temporary ex parte risk 
protection if she finds by “reasonable cause” that the respondent poses a significant danger of causing 
personal injury to himself or others in the “near future.” Id. § 790.401(4)(c). Notice is not given to the 
respondent before law enforcement executes the temporary ex parte risk protection order. Id. 
§ 790.401(4)(a). The judge must hold a full hearing within fourteen days of the grant of the temporary 
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statutory scheme is similar to that of Connecticut, but with two notable differ-
ences: (1) only law enforcement officers or law enforcement agencies can file 
for either type of risk protection order; and (2) with respect to full risk protec-
tion orders, a petitioner is not required to show that the “significant danger” 
posed by the respondent is imminent or likely to arise in the near future.105 In 
addition, the law lists fifteen factors a judge may consider when making a de-
termination of whether the respondent poses a significant risk to himself or 
others by possessing firearms.106 
In 2019, in Davis v. Gilchrest County Sheriff’s Office, a Florida appeals 
court considered a constitutional challenge to the state’s red flag law.107 The 
respondent, a former Deputy Sheriff with the Gilchrest County Sheriff’s Of-
fice, discovered that his girlfriend of six years was also carrying on a relation-
ship with another officer in the Sheriff’s Office.108 The respondent contacted 
the sheriff to ask for help.109 After the sheriff asked him how he felt about the 
situation, the respondent answered by saying he was so upset he wanted to kill 
the other man with his gun.110 Based on that statement, law enforcement sub-
sequently filed a petition for a full risk protection order to seize the respond-
ent’s firearms for a year, which was granted by a judge.111 The respondent ap-
                                                                                                                           
ex parte risk protection order, at which time the state may petition for a full risk protection order. Id. 
§ 790.401(3)(a). At the full hearing, the state’s burden of proof is “clear and convincing.” Id. 
§ 790.401(3)(b). If the judge deems the state to have met its burden, the judge must grant the risk pro-
tection order. Id. 
 105 See id. § 790.401(2)(a), (3)(a) (containing no imminence requirement). For temporary ex parte 
risk protection orders, however, a petitioner is required to show imminence: that the respondent poses 
a significant danger of causing personal injury to himself or herself or others in the “near future.” Id. 
§ 790.401(4)(a). “Near future” is not defined in the statute. See id. § 790.401(1). This author’s March 
2020 canvass of the nineteen jurisdictions that had red flag laws on the books determined that sixteen 
out of the nineteen require some showing of sufficient imminence for a temporary ex parte risk protec-
tion order to be granted (the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, and New York did not). D.C. CODE 
§ 7-2510.04; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131T; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6342. Only five out of nineteen jurisdic-
tions, however, require some showing of sufficient imminence for full risk protection orders to be grant-
ed (Connecticut, Indiana, New Mexico, Oregon, and Rhode Island). CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-
38c(d); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-14-6; N.M. S. 5; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.527(6)(a); 8 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 8-8.3-5(a).  
 106 FLA. STAT. § 790.401(3)(c). Those factors include: (1) a recent act or threat of violence, though 
the terms “act of violence” and “threat of violence” are not defined; (2) any act or threat of violence 
within the last twelve months; (3) evidence of a serious mental illness, though that is not defined; (4) 
reckless use, display, or brandishing of a firearm. Id. In the case of Christian Velasquez, discussed 
supra notes 6–10, the judge denied law enforcement’s petition for a risk protection order because he did 
not feel that what Velasquez said amounted to “threats of violence,” nor did he feel Velasquez suffered 
from a “serious mental illness.” Temporary Ex Parte Risk Protection Order, supra note 10, at 1. 
 107 280 So. 3d at 528 (considering vagueness, due process, and Second Amendment challenges to 
Florida’s red flag law). 
 108 Amended Initial Brief of Appellant, supra note 22, at 2–3. 
 109 Id. at 3. 
 110 Id. at 5. 
 111 Id. at 6, 12. Following his comment to the sheriff, the petitioner was evaluated at a hospital 
and submitted for an involuntary examination pursuant to Florida’s Baker Act. Id. at 5. Mental health 
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pealed the order and challenged the constitutionality of the law under theories 
of vagueness and substantive due process.112 The appeals court rejected the 
challenge, ruling that the law’s language was not vague and that it contained 
sufficient due process safeguards.113 In addition, at least one Florida court has 
ruled that a risk protection order may not be granted based on conduct that oc-
curred before the law’s passage.114 
II. SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE POST-HELLER 
In 2008, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court issued a 
landmark ruling that greatly expanded the Second Amendment’s protections.115 
In 2010, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court applied Heller’s expansive 
holding to the states.116 The two decisions, however, left little by way of an 
analytical framework for lower courts to follow in subsequent Second 
                                                                                                                           
professionals discharged the petitioner without requiring any follow-up and gave him a violence risk 
category assessment of zero. Id. The petitioner argued, inter alia, that the hyperbolic statements he 
made in frustration were not sufficient to support the state’s deprivation of his Second Amendment 
rights. Id. at 14. 
 112 See id. at 32, 39–42 (arguing that terms in the statute are unconstitutionally vague and that 
because the law improperly infringes on two fundamental rights—speech and the right to bear arms—
the court should evaluate the law under strict scrutiny); see also Davis, 280 So. 3d at 531–32. The 
respondent argued that the law impermissibly required an individual to choose between exercising his 
fundamental rights to free speech and bear arms. Amended Initial Brief of Appellant, supra note 22, at 
42. 
 113 Davis, 280 So. 3d at 532–33. The Florida appeals court did not specifically address the re-
spondent’s First and Second Amendment substantive due process claims. Id. at 533. Instead, it based 
its ruling on procedural due process considerations. See id. The court noted, 
The statute also requires a hearing within fourteen days of an RPO petition being filed, 
thus affording a respondent due process . . . . Moreover, the statute incorporates an add-
ed due process safeguard by requiring proponents to meet the heightened “clear and 
convincing” burden of proof standard . . . . Furthermore, the duration of the RPO may 
not exceed twelve months . . . . 
Id. The court purported to apply strict scrutiny to the statute and seemed to assume the statute bur-
dened individuals’ fundamental rights, but did not analyze whether that burden was constitutionally 
justified. See id. at 531–33 (announcing that Florida courts apply strict scrutiny to a statue that “im-
pairs the exercise of a fundamental right,” and finding that the statute addresses a compelling interest 
of thwarting public shootings, but not evaluating whether the statute’s burden on fundamental rights is 
appropriately tailored). The court also declined to address the respondent’s as-applied challenge, rul-
ing it was waived since it had not been argued before the trial court. Id. at 531. 
 114 Order Dissolving Temporary Risk Protection Order and Granting the Respondent’s Motion to 
Dismiss the Risk Protection Petition on Retroactive Application Grounds at 1, City of Apopka v. 
Thorn, No. 2018-MH-2002-O (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 24, 2018). 
 115 See 554 U.S. 570, 581, 635 (2008). See generally Christopher Dunn, The Gun Grenade in the 
Hands of the Supreme Court, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/
02/06/the-gun-grenade-in-the-hands-of-the-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/BE66-U6HC] (providing 
background on Second Amendment jurisprudence in his capacity as Legal Director of New York Civil 
Liberties Union). 
 116 See 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
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Amendment cases.117 The rulings also included ambiguous dicta that left lower 
courts guessing as to how to answer key doctrinal questions.118 Section A of 
this Part briefly summarizes the important legal rules from the Supreme Court’s 
two landmark Second Amendment cases.119 Section B of this Part discusses the 
two-part test nearly all federal circuits have adopted for evaluating whether laws 
violate the Second Amendment.120 Section C of this Part examines how the fed-
eral circuit courts have treated Heller’s ambiguous dicta about certain presump-
tively lawful regulatory infringements on the right to bear arms.121 
A. Heller and McDonald: Delineating the Right to Bear Arms 
In Heller, the Supreme Court waded into the nation’s gun debate and de-
cided for the first time that the scope of the Second Amendment’s protection 
includes an individual’s fundamental right to keep and bear arms for the pur-
poses of self-defense in the home, unconnected to service in a militia.122 After 
an extensive textual and historical analysis of the Second Amendment, Justice 
Scalia, writing for the majority, struck down two District of Columbia ordi-
nances as facially unconstitutional: one that prohibited individuals from pos-
sessing handguns and another that banned individuals from keeping assem-
bled, functional firearms in the home.123 
In so ruling, the Court made clear that though the Second Amendment’s 
protections extend to lawful activities like hunting, target-shooting, and partici-
                                                                                                                           
 117 AMY SWEARER, HERITAGE FOUND., LONGSTANDING AND PRESUMPTIVELY LAWFUL? HELLER’S 
DICTA V. HISTORY AND DICTA 2 (2018), https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/LM-238.
pdf [https://perma.cc/A96T-2C4P]. 
 118 Id. at 2; see United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010). The Third Circuit 
explained how Heller’s “presumptively lawful” dictum left unsolved what is still an open question 
among the federal circuits: whether the measures listed are presumptively lawful because they: (1) 
concern conduct outside the scope of the Second Amendment’s protection, or (2) concern conduct 
within the scope of the Second Amendment that is justifiably restricted under some level of scrutiny. 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91. 
 119 See infra notes 122–130 and accompanying text. 
 120 See infra notes 131–142 and accompanying text. 
 121 See infra notes 143–150 and accompanying text. 
 122 See 554 U.S. at 581, 635 (explaining that the Second Amendment “surely elevates above all 
other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and 
home” and that the right is “exercised individually and belongs to all Americans”); see also Green-
house, supra note 33 (detailing how the court rejected the until-then prevailing view that the Second 
Amendment enshrined the right to bear arms only if exercised collectively or in connection with ser-
vice in a militia). The Court had not meaningfully examined the Second Amendment in seventy years. 
Greenhouse, supra note 33 (noting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) as the Court’s seminal 
Second Amendment decision that preceded Heller).  
 123 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. The Court also considered a third D.C. ordinance prohibiting the 
carrying of a firearm (including in one’s home) without first obtaining a license. Id. The Court left that 
ordinance intact, but ruled that the District of Columbia had to issue the requisite license to the plain-
tiff. Id. at 576, 635. 
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pating in a militia, self-defense in the home is at the core of the right.124 Though 
the Court did not specify the standard of scrutiny under which courts should 
evaluate laws implicating rights guaranteed by the Second Amendment, it did 
reject rational basis review and “interest-balancing” approaches as insufficient to 
afford proper protection to the right.125 But the Court also explained that the 
rights secured by the Second Amendment are not unlimited and do not guarantee 
a right to keep or bear arms in any manner and for any purpose.126 To that end, 
Justice Scalia wrote in a footnote that longstanding prohibitions on the posses-
sion of firearms by felons and the mentally ill are “presumptively lawful.”127 
In McDonald, the Supreme Court followed up on its decision by incorpo-
rating the Second Amendment as fully applicable to the states.128 The Court 
was unequivocal that Second Amendment rights are just as fundamental as 
other rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and warned courts not to treat it 
                                                                                                                           
 124 See id. at 614, 628–29, 635 (stating that “the inherent right of self-defense has been central to 
the Second Amendment right” and explaining that the home is where an individual’s need for self-
defense is most critical). 
 125 Id. at 628 n.27. The Court noted, 
Obviously, [rational basis review] could not be used to evaluate the extent to which a 
legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the 
guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear 
arms . . . . If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a ra-
tional basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitution-
al prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect. 
Id. (citations omitted); see id. at 634 (“We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose 
core protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”). 
 126 Id. at 626. 
 127 Id. at 626–27 n.26. The Court did not allude to any historical evidence to support the notion 
that felons or the mentally ill were not understood to have Second Amendment rights at the time of 
the Constitution’s ratification. Id.; see SWEARER, supra note 117, at 2 (“The Court did not attempt to 
justify this presumption or its assertion that such prohibitions are long-standing in nature . . . .”). In 
addition to felons and the mentally ill, Justice Scalia’s list of “presumptively lawful” regulations also 
included laws prohibiting the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools or government 
buildings, and laws imposing certain burdens on the commercial sale of firearms. Heller, 554 U.S. at 
626–27 n.26. The Court declined to elaborate on justifications for these four exceptions, choosing 
instead to wait for a case to raise the specific issue. Id. at 626–27 n.26, 635. Although the exceptions 
were arguably dicta, courts generally treat Supreme Court dicta from recent cases as binding. See 
United States v. Colasuonno, 697 F.3d 164, 179 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[W]e have an obligation to accord 
great deference to Supreme Court dicta . . . .”); McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st 
Cir. 1991) (“We think that federal appellate courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s considered dicta 
almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings, particularly when, as here, a dictum is of recent 
vintage and not enfeebled by any subsequent statement.”). On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit has 
side-stepped much of Heller’s dicta and followed alternative approaches. See Friedman v. City of 
Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Cautionary language about what has been left 
open should not be read as if it were part of the Constitution or answered all possible questions.”). 
Scholars have speculated that Justice Scalia included the “presumptively lawful” dicta to win Justice 
Kennedy’s fifth and deciding vote. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Heller and the Perils of Compromise, 13 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 419, 420 (2009) (supporting this view). 
 128 See 561 U.S. at 750. 
2020] Red Flag Laws & Current Second Amendment Jurisprudence 1513 
as a “second class” right.129 But the McDonald Court did not attempt to clarify 
any of Heller’s ambiguous language; instead, Justice Alito, writing for the ma-
jority, simply repeated Heller’s dicta declaring certain longstanding regulatory 
measures to be “presumptively lawful.”130 
B. Second Amendment Jurisprudence’s Two-Part Test 
Though landmark decisions, Heller and McDonald left little by way of an 
analytical framework for lower courts to follow in subsequent Second 
Amendment cases.131 Nevertheless, almost every federal circuit has adopted 
some form of the two-step test announced by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Marzzarella.132 
Step One of the test asks whether the challenged law implicates or in-
fringes upon conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s pro-
                                                                                                                           
 129 Id. at 778–80. As if to hammer home the point, Justice Alito wrote that the Second Amend-
ment may not be “singled out [by courts] for special—and specially unfavorable— treatment.” Id. at 
779–80. 
 130 Id. at 786. The McDonald Court’s decision to simply reiterate Heller’s “presumptively lawful” 
dicta left unsolved what is still an open question among the federal circuits: whether the presumptive-
ly lawful measures (1) concern conduct outside the scope of the Second Amendment’s protection; or 
(2) concern conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment that is justifiably restricted under 
some level of scrutiny. See, e.g., Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91 (suggesting that both interpretations of 
Heller dicta are reasonable). 
 131 SWEARER, supra note 117, at 2. That the court did not provide a framework was likely inten-
tional. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“But since this case represents this Court’s first in-depth examina-
tion of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire field, any more than 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), our first in-depth Free Exercise Clause case . . . .”) 
(citation omitted). 
 132 614 F.3d at 89; see N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 254 (2d Cir. 
2015) (explaining that the two-step approach has also been adopted by the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits). The Marzzarella court fashioned this two-step 
approach by looking to First Amendment jurisprudence for guidance. 614 F.3d at 89 n.4; see David B. 
Kopel, The First Amendment Guide to the Second Amendment, 81 TENN. L. REV. 417, 435 (2014) 
(discussing the Third and Seventh Circuits’ adoption of the First Amendment analytical framework 
into Second Amendment cases). The Sixth Circuit has questioned the wisdom of Marzzarella’s impor-
tation of First Amendment jurisprudence into the doctrine governing the Second Amendment. See 
Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Tyler I), 775 F.3d 308, 318 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated, 837 F.3d 
678 (6th Cir. 2016). The Sixth Circuit noted, 
There may be a number of reasons to question the soundness of this two-step approach. 
It derives from the Third Circuit’s decision in [Marzzarella], which primarily rested on 
a view that because “Heller itself repeatedly invokes the First Amendment in establish-
ing principles governing the Second Amendment,” that fact “implies the structure of 
First Amendment doctrine should inform . . . analysis of the Second Amendment.” . . . 
There is significant language in Heller itself, however, that would indicate that lower 
courts should not conduct interest balancing or apply levels of scrutiny. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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tection.133 To determine whether the conduct implicates the Second Amend-
ment, courts will look to whether the conduct was understood to fall within the 
scope of the Amendment when it was ratified in 1791.134 At this step, the gov-
ernment bears the burden of showing that the activity, person, or thing at issue 
is outside the scope of the Second Amendment as traditionally understood.135 
If the conduct does not fall within the Amendment’s scope, the challenged reg-
ulation passes constitutional muster and the inquiry is over.136 
If the conduct does indeed fall within the Amendment’s scope, the court 
then moves on to Step Two, where it analyzes the law under some form of 
heightened means-end scrutiny—at least, in theory.137 In practice, however, 
                                                                                                                           
 133 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89. This threshold inquiry seems to follow from Heller. See 554 U.S. 
at 635 (ordering the District of Columbia to issue a license to Heller, as long as he is “not disqualified 
from the exercise of Second Amendment rights”). At this step, the burden of proof is on the govern-
ment. Dave Kopel & Joseph Greenlee, The Federal Circuit Courts’ Second Amendment Doctrine, 61 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 193, 214 (2016). 
 134 See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89–90 (explaining that the Supreme Court has instructed courts, 
when determining the scope of an enumerated right, to look to how the right was interpreted at the 
time of ratification); see also Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Tyler II), 837 F.3d 678, 685–86 
(6th Cir. 2016) (“If the government establishes that the challenged law regulates activity outside the 
scope of the Second Amendment as understood at the time of the framing of the Bill of Rights, the 
activity is unprotected and the law is not subjected to further constitutional scrutiny.”); Nat’l Rifle 
Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th 
Cir. 2012) (“To determine whether a law impinges on the Second Amendment right, we look to 
whether the law harmonizes with the historical traditions associated with the Second Amendment 
guarantee.”); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Under the first prong, the 
court asks whether the challenged law burdens conduct that falls within the scope of the Second 
Amendment right, as historically understood.”); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 
2010) (“This historical inquiry seeks to determine whether the conduct at issue was understood to be 
within the scope of the right at the time of ratification.”). 
 135 Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 133, at 214. 
 136 N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc., 804 F.3d at 254; Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89. 
 137 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89. Means-end scrutiny generally refers to the mode of analysis 
courts use to ensure government action complies with constitutional principles. Russell W. Galloway, 
Means-End Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 449, 449 (1988). Height-
ened scrutiny generally refers to either strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny. See Kopel & Greenlee, 
supra note 133, at 302 (explaining that strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny are the best-known 
forms of heightened scrutiny). Strict scrutiny promotes several principles, including: (1) that im-
portant rights deserve special protection, (2) these rights are best protected by requiring sufficiently 
compelling government interests, and (3) unneeded deprivation of individual rights is best avoided by 
requiring close attention to the breadth of the policy or law. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 
304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (indicating that a higher level of scrutiny should apply to legislation that 
implicates important rights, such as those enumerated in the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights); see 
also Richard Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1273–75 (2006) (tracing the 
emergence of strict scrutiny in Supreme Court jurisprudence). Strict scrutiny places the burden on the 
government to show that the law is narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. Id. at 1301. 
Intermediate scrutiny is less exacting, requiring that the law be substantially related to an important 
government interest. Id. at 1302. Some courts use the language of “reasonable fit” between the law 
and the interest to be addressed. Id. The Supreme Court has explicitly deployed intermediate scrutiny 
only in cases involving biological sex classifications and in “content-neutral” First Amendment regu-
lations. SWEARER, supra note 117, at 2 n.13. 
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some federal circuits end up applying the sort of interest-balancing approach 
explicitly rejected by Justice Scalia in Heller.138 To be sure, the appropriate 
level of scrutiny to apply in Second Amendment cases has generated much 
debate among legal scholars and has even prompted state legislatures to codify 
a particular standard into law.139 As with Step One, the burden at Step Two is 
on the government to prove that the law passes whichever level of scrutiny 
applied by the court.140 Though it is undisputed the government bears the bur-
den of proof at Step Two, federal circuits disagree on the amount of evidence 
governments must put forth to satisfy that burden under intermediate or strict 
scrutiny.141 The circuits also disagree on when a general government interest of 
                                                                                                                           
 138 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27; see Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 821 (9th Cir. 2016) (refer-
ring to the means-end scrutiny as a “sliding scale”); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc., 700 F.3d at 195 
(holding that a law burdening the core of Second Amendment right—self-defense in home—gets strict 
scrutiny, while a less severe burden gets a less exacting form of means-end scrutiny); United States v. 
Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting the application of heightened scrutiny to laws only 
when the Second Amendment right is substantially burdened); Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 
F.3d 1244, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[A] regulation that imposes a less substantial burden should be 
proportionately easier to justify.”). 
 139 See, e.g., Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia 
v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L. J. 1371, 1379–80, 1382 (2009) (arguing that Heller 
implicitly ruled out strict scrutiny because the four identified “presumptively lawful” restrictions on 
Second Amendment rights could not survive strict scrutiny); Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment 
Plumbing After Heller: Of Standards of Scrutiny, Incorporation, Well-Regulated Militias, and Crimi-
nal Street Gangs, 41 URB. LAW. 1, 82–84 (2009) (proposing undue burden test); Stacey L. Sobel, The 
Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’s a Court to Do Post-McDonald?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 489, 493 (2012) (same); Fredrick E. Vars & Amanda Adcock Young, Do the Mentally Ill Have 
a Right to Bear Arms?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 7–11 (2013) (discussing reasonableness, interme-
diate scrutiny, strict scrutiny, and hybrid approaches as possibilities); Eugene Volokh, Implementing 
the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 
56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1446–47 (2009) (arguing that courts should discard the standard tiers of 
scrutiny in the Second Amendment context, and instead analyze the challenged law based on four 
discrete categories purportedly justifying the restriction of the right); Stephen Kiehl, Note, In Search 
of a Standard: Gun Regulations After Heller and McDonald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1133 (2011) (ar-
guing that courts should apply intermediate scrutiny when evaluating firearm regulations that are not 
complete bans on possession); Elke C. Meeùs, Note, The Second Amendment in Need of a Shot in the 
Arm: Overhauling the Courts’ Standards of Scrutiny, 45 W. ST. U. L. REV. 29, 73 (2017) (suggesting 
an approach whereby courts consider two factors to determine whether strict or intermediate scrutiny 
applies: (1) the degree to which the law restricts the “core” of the right; and (2) the extent of the law’s 
restriction); Jason Racine, Note, What the Hell(er)? The Fine Print Standard of Review Under Heller, 
29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 605, 618 (2009) (proposing a three-step test considering categorical rules, the 
nature of the firearm to be regulated, and the intended locality of the regulation). Given the confusion 
surrounding which level of scrutiny courts ought to apply in Second Amendment cases, three states—
Louisiana, Missouri, and Alabama—have gone so far as to codify the standard of review in their state 
constitutions. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 26 (codifying strict scrutiny as applicable standard); LA. CONST. 
art. I, § 11 (same); MO. CONST. art. I, § 23 (same). 
 140 Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 133, at 214. 
 141 See, e.g., Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436–37 (3d Cir. 2013) (giving great deference to legis-
lature’s decisions and wisdom within the context of the Second Amendment); Kachalsky v. County of 
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 97 (2d Cir 2012) (same). Other courts require a greater showing of evi-
dence to prove the restriction’s justification. See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 709–10 
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“reducing crime” or “increasing public safety,” without supporting data or 
proof, is sufficient under intermediate scrutiny to justify an infringement on a 
Second Amendment right.142 
C. The Difficult Applications: “Presumptively Lawful” Regulations 
Most applications of the two-part test are at least conceptually straight-
forward; however, the analysis gets complicated when applied to cases involv-
ing the “longstanding” and “presumptively lawful” measures identified in Hel-
ler.143 These measures include: laws barring firearms for (1) felons and (2) the 
mentally ill; (3) laws prohibiting firearms in “sensitive places”; and (4) laws 
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.144 For 
cases involving a challenge to these type of laws, the question is: should the 
government win at Step One because any law that regulates conduct falling 
within Heller’s listed exceptions does not implicate the Second Amend-
ment?145 Or, alternatively, should these laws be scrutinized at Step Two, with 
the (rebuttable) presumption that they pass constitutional muster?146 
To illustrate this question, consider a law banning the carrying of firearms 
in federal post offices and recall that Heller identified laws prohibiting firearms 
in “sensitive places” as “presumptively lawful.”147 Heller’s listing of the “sensi-
tive places” exception could imply that no person has Second Amendment rights 
in government buildings (failing at Step One), or it could imply that the right 
                                                                                                                           
(7th Cir. 2011) (holding restriction on firearm ownership was unconstitutional because the govern-
ment produced no evidence to justify it); Chester I, 628 F.3d at 683 (ruling against the government 
because it offered “reasons,” rather than evidence, to support the law’s Second Amendment infringe-
ment). 
 142 Compare Wollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 879 (4th Cir. 2013) (concluding that Mary-
land’s “good-and-substantial” requirement to obtain handgun permit passed intermediate scrutiny be-
cause it advanced public safety by reducing number of handguns in public), with Moore v. Madigan, 702 
F.3d 933, 939 (7th Cir. 2012) (rejecting “mere possibility that allowing guns to be carried in public 
would increase the crime or death rates” as sufficient justification for restriction of public carry). 
 143 Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 133, at 214. 
 144 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27, 627 n.26. 
 145 Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 133, at 216. Some circuits have resolved cases dealing with the 
“presumptively lawful” regulations identified in Heller at Step One. See, e.g., Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 
at 91 (noting that the Court in Heller discussed “presumptively lawful” regulations immediately pre-
ceding its discussion of unusual and dangerous weapons, which the Court stated do not fall within the 
Amendment’s protections). 
 146 Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 133, at 216. Some circuits have resolved cases dealing with the 
“presumptively lawful” regulations identified in Heller at Step Two. See, e.g., Chester I, 628 F.3d at 
679 (rejecting the approach of concluding the conduct is outside the scope of Second Amendment at 
Step One as approximating a kind of rational basis review which Heller expressly proscribed). The 
Fourth Circuit in Chester I suggested resolving the inquiry at Step Two under some form of height-
ened scrutiny, observing that a “presumptively lawful” regulation could be shown to be unconstitu-
tional, particularly in as-applied challenges. Id. 
 147 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 n.26; see Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1123 (10th Cir. 
2015) (illustrating a challenge to such a law). 
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extends to such buildings but that a restriction on carrying firearms in them pre-
sumptively survives scrutiny at Step Two.148 The difference between the two 
interpretations is significant: if the first interpretation is adopted, it would follow 
that no plaintiff could ever successfully challenge the regulation; if the second is 
adopted, there could be situations where the regulation unconstitutionally bur-
dens the right.149 While the question of whether to analyze Heller’s “presump-
tively lawful” regulations at Step One or Step Two remains unresolved, another 
question arises: whether regulations resembling those listed in Heller could also 
be considered among the “presumptively lawful” categories.150 
III. COURTS’ TREATMENT OF RED FLAG LAWS AND THEIR  
“PRESUMPTIVELY LAWFUL” BRETHREN 
District of Columbia v. Heller’s “presumptively lawful” dicta can, argua-
bly, be applied to two different categories of laws: (1) laws that fit exactly 
within the list of permissible Second Amendment regulation, such as laws pro-
hibiting the possession of firearms by felons or the mentally ill; and (2) laws 
that resemble or might be analogized to something on the list, such as laws 
banning the possession of firearms by types of individuals considered especial-
ly dangerous.151 Since red flag laws apply to individuals regardless of whether 
the individual is a felon or has been found mentally ill, the laws are best de-
scribed to fit within that second category.152 As of this Note’s writing, no fed-
eral court has considered a Second Amendment challenge to a red flag law; 
however, federal courts have considered Second Amendment challenges to 
laws that fit within the second category outlined above.153 In an effort to shed 
                                                                                                                           
 148 Bonidy, 790 F.3d at 1136 n.7 (Tymkovich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 149 See id. (arguing that interpreting Heller to mean that no person has Second Amendment rights 
in government buildings “goes too far”); see also United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (noting that although a law prohibiting felons from possessing firearms did not violate the 
Second Amendment on its face, an as-applied challenge by a non-violent felon might succeed). 
 150 Heller, 554 U.S. 626 n.26. The Third Circuit has cautioned against extending the “presump-
tively lawful” exception to new regulations that resemble but are not among those explicitly listed by 
Heller. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 93 (“[P]rudence counsels caution when extending these recog-
nized exceptions to novel regulations unmentioned by Heller.”). 
 151 554 U.S. 570, 627 n.26 (2008); Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 133, at 215. 
 152 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 790.401(3) (2018) (applying to anyone found to pose a “significant 
danger of causing personal injury to himself or others by having in his or her custody or control, or by 
purchasing, possessing, or receiving, a firearm,” and listing evidence of “recurring mental health is-
sues”—notably, not an adjudication of mental illness—as one of fifteen different criteria a judge may 
consider in determining whether to grant the order). In comparison, the federal statute that prohibits 
the mentally ill from possessing a firearm only applies if the individual has been formally adjudicated 
mentally ill or involuntarily committed. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2018). 
 153 See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 750 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir. 2014) (upholding § 922(g)(3), 
the federal statute prohibiting drug users from possessing firearms); United States v. Dugan, 657 F.3d 
998, 1000 (9th Cir. 2011) (upholding same statute); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 804 (10th 
Cir. 2010) (upholding § 922(g)(8), the federal statute prohibiting individuals subject to a restraining 
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light on how courts might go about analyzing a Second Amendment challenge 
to a red flag law, Section A of this Part will discuss how several federal circuit 
courts have analyzed challenges to laws in the second category described 
above—laws that regulate possession of firearms of individuals society con-
siders especially dangerous but who are not felons or mentally ill.154 Section B 
of this Part will then discuss the analytical framework used by the Appellate 
Court of Connecticut and the Indiana Court of Appeals in upholding their re-
spective states’ red flag laws as constitutional.155 
A. Federal Courts’ Treatment of Laws Regulating the Possession  
of Firearms by Dangerous Individuals 
Step One of the two-step test asks whether the challenged law implicates 
or infringes upon conduct or individuals falling within the scope of the Second 
Amendment’s protections.156 When evaluating a regulation that resembles one 
of the “presumptively lawful” regulations listed in Heller, some courts simply 
give a quick cite to Heller’s dicta and conclude that the regulation in question 
is lawful because its purpose is generally similar to the “presumptively lawful” 
regulations on felons and the mentally ill.157 These courts, for all practical pur-
poses, resolve the case at Step One because they assume Heller to have placed 
felons, the mentally ill, and other similar classes of persons as outside the Sec-
                                                                                                                           
order from possessing firearms, in face of as-applied challenge); United States v. White, 593 F.3d 
1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) (upholding § 922(g)(9), the federal statute prohibiting domestic violence 
misdemeanants from possessing firearms). 
 154 See infra notes 156–191 and accompanying text. 
 155 See infra notes 192–212 and accompanying text. 
 156 United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010). This threshold inquiry seems to 
follow from Heller. See 554 U.S. at 635 (ordering the District of Columbia to issue a license to Heller, 
as long as he is “not disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights”). 
 157 See, e.g., Dugan, 657 F.3d at 999–1000. The Ninth Circuit noted, 
Like our sister circuits, we see the same amount of danger in allowing habitual drug us-
ers to traffic in firearms as we see in allowing felons and mentally ill people to do so. 
Habitual drug users, like career criminals and the mentally ill, more likely will have dif-
ficulty exercising self-control, particularly when they are under the influence of con-
trolled substances. 
Id.; see also United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 925 (8th Cir. 2010) (“As such, we find that 
§ 922(g)(3) is the type of ‘longstanding prohibition[] on the possession of firearms’ that Heller de-
clared presumptively lawful.”) (alteration in original); White, 593 F.3d at 1206 (“We see no reason to 
exclude § 922(g)(9) from the list of longstanding prohibitions on which Heller does not cast doubt.”); 
United States v. Richard, 350 F. App’x 252, 260 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Heller’s presumptively law-
ful measures and concluding § 922(g)(3) is among them, and thus, is constitutional); United States v. 
Korbe, No. 09-05, 2010 WL 2404394, at * 3–4 (W.D. Pa. June 9, 2010) (holding that § 922(g)(3) is 
among Heller’s “presumptively lawful” regulations); United States v. Lacy, No. 09-CR-135, 2009 
WL 3756987, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 6, 2009) (resolving the case upon concluding that “nothing in 
Heller indicates that § 922(g)(3) somehow falls outside the range of permissible limitations on the 
right to bear arms”). 
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ond Amendment’s scope.158 For example, in 2010, in United States v. Dugan, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered a facial challenge to 
a federal provision that prohibits unlawful users of drugs from possessing fire-
arms.159 The Dugan court upheld the provision, reasoning that Heller implicit-
ly allowed for categorical prohibitions on drug users because drug users are 
just as dangerous as felons and the mentally ill.160 
Though the Dugan court did not articulate the usual two-step test, it im-
plicitly resolved the issue at Step One, reasoning that regulations on some clas-
ses of individuals similar to felons and the mentally ill—like drug users—fall 
outside the Second Amendment’s scope.161 As a result, regulations targeting 
such classes are constitutional.162 Other circuits have followed a similar ap-
proach when analyzing Second Amendment challenges to the same statute that 
was at issue in Dugan: a citation to Heller, a comparison of drug users’ pro-
pensity for violence to that of felons or the mentally ill, and no means-end 
analysis.163 
Likewise, courts have followed a similar approach when considering 
challenges to prohibitions on possession of firearms by domestic violence mis-
demeanants.164 In 2010, in United States v. White, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
                                                                                                                           
 158 See, e.g., United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 1184 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Insofar as § 922(g)(8) 
prohibits possession of firearms by those who are found to represent ‘a credible threat to the physical 
safety of [an] intimate partner or child,’ . . . it is consistent with a common-law tradition that the right 
to bear arms is limited to peaceable or virtuous citizens.”) (alteration in original). 
 159 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3); 657 F.3d at 999. In passing § 922(g)(3), Congress intended to reduce 
the likelihood that firearms would find their way into the hands of dangerous people. Seay, 620 F.3d 
at 925. 
 160 See Dugan, 657 F.3d at 999. In Dugan, the court explained, 
[W]e see the same amount of danger in allowing habitual drug users to traffic in fire-
arms as we see in allowing felons and mentally ill people to do so . . . . Because Con-
gress [under Heller] may constitutionally deprive felons and mentally ill people of the 
right to possess and carry weapons, we conclude that Congress may also prohibit illegal 
drug users from possessing firearms. 
Id. By its own terms, however, Heller did not conclusively allow for categorical prohibitions on pos-
session of firearms by felons and the mentally ill. See Heller, 554 at 626–27 (observing that such 
regulations would be “presumptively” lawful—not “conclusively” lawful); see also Tyler v. Hillsdale 
Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Tyler II), 837 F.3d 678, 686 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Heller only established a presump-
tion that such bans were lawful; it did not invite courts onto an analytical off-ramp to avoid constitu-
tional analysis.”). 
 161 See 657 F.3d at 999–1000 (resolving the issue without conducting a means-end scrutiny analy-
sis). If the Dugan court had concluded that drug users have Second Amendment rights, it would nec-
essarily have had to evaluate the law under some form of heightened scrutiny. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 
626 (precluding rational-basis review in Second Amendment analysis). 
 162 Dugan, 657 F.3d at 999–1000. 
 163 See Seay, 620 F.3d at 925 (“As such, we find that § 922(g)(3) is the type of ‘longstanding 
prohibition[] on the possession of firearms’ that Heller declared presumptively lawful.”) (alteration in 
original); Richard, 350 F. App’x at 260 (citing Heller’s presumptively lawful measures and conclud-
ing § 922(g)(3) is among them, and thus is constitutional). 
 164 White, 593 F.3d at 1206. 
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for the Eleventh Circuit considered a Second Amendment challenge to a feder-
al statute that prohibits domestic violence misdemeanants from possessing a 
firearm.165 Like the Dugan court, the White court equated domestic violence 
misdemeanants to felons and the mentally ill, and then quickly upheld the fed-
eral statute as a “presumptively lawful” and longstanding measure on which 
Heller cast no constitutional doubt.166 
As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit observed in another 
case, courts following the Dugan and White approach essentially treat Heller’s 
“presumptively lawful” dicta as a “safe harbor” for unlisted regulatory 
measures that merely resemble those that are listed.167 The Fourth Circuit criti-
cized that approach as approximating rational basis review, a level of scrutiny 
Heller expressly forbid for Second Amendment challenges.168 To that end, 
some circuits have embraced the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning and rejected the 
Dugan court’s “safe harbor” approach.169 These courts heeded the Third Cir-
cuit’s caution in Marzzarella that regulations that merely resemble the “pre-
sumptively lawful” regulations listed in Heller should not be given such an 
easy pass, and instead be evaluated under heightened scrutiny at Step Two.170 
In 2010, in United States v. Chester, the Fourth Circuit demonstrated the 
Step Two analysis when considering a Second Amendment challenge to the fed-
eral ban on the possession of firearms by domestic violence misdemeanants.171 
The Chester court began its analysis at Step One by asking whether domestic 
violence misdemeanants have a right to keep and bear arms protected by the 
Second Amendment.172 To determine this, the court looked to whether domestic 
violence misdemeanants had Second Amendment rights at the time of the Con-
stitution’s ratification.173 Finding the evidence to be inconclusive, the court as-
sumed arguendo that domestic violence misdemeanants do have Second 
                                                                                                                           
 165 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9); White, 593 F.3d at 1206. The statute, known as the Lautenberg Amend-
ment, was passed by Congress to reduce the likelihood that firearms end up in the hands of people 
deemed dangerous by society. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 1117 (2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-1117-restrictions-possession-firearms-individuals-
convicted [https://perma.cc/D6C8-S48C]. 
 166 White, 593 F.3d at 1206. 
 167 United States v. Chester (Chester I), 628 F.3d 673, 679 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 168 Id.; see Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27, 634–35 (rejecting rational basis review and “interest-
balancing” tests as insufficient for evaluating the extent to which a regulation may infringe upon a 
fundamental right). 
 169 See, e.g., Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 686; United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 
2013); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 517–18 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Because [Heller’s] list does 
not contain the Section 2D1.1(b)(1) dangerous weapon enhancement at issue in this case, we cannot 
rely on the list, alone, to reject Greeno’s Second Amendment challenge.”); United States v. Staten, 
666 F.3d 154, 160 (4th Cir. 2011); Reese, 627 F.3d at 800–01. 
 170 See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 93. 
 171 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9); Chester I, 628 F.3d at 673. 
 172 Chester I, 628 F.3d at 680–81. 
 173 Id. 
2020] Red Flag Laws & Current Second Amendment Jurisprudence 1521 
Amendment rights.174 At Step Two, the court announced that intermediate scru-
tiny was the applicable level of scrutiny.175 It then remanded the case to the dis-
trict court because the government did not meet its burden of showing that the 
prohibition was substantially related to an important government interest.176 
Other courts have taken a similar approach when evaluating challenges to the 
federal ban on firearm possession by domestic violence misdemeanants.177 
                                                                                                                           
 174 Id. Whether or not felons—let alone misdemeanants—had Second Amendment rights at the 
time of the founding and beyond has been a subject of substantial debate among scholars. Compare C. 
Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 714 
(2009) (reviewing founding-era precedents and explaining, “much like the American authorities for a 
century and a half after the Second Amendment’s adoption, the actual English antecedents point 
against lifetime total disarmament of all ‘felons,’ but do support lesser limitations”), and Larson, su-
pra note 139, at 1376 (“[State and federal] felon disarmament laws significantly postdate both the 
Second Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. An Originalist argument that sought to identify 
1791 or 1868 analogues to felon disarmament laws would be quite difficult to make.”), with Don B. 
Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second Amendment Limitations and Criminological Considerations, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 1339, 1360 (2009) (“[T]here is every reason to believe that the Founding Fathers 
would have deemed persons convicted of any of the common law felonies not to be among ‘the [vir-
tuous] people’ to whom they were guaranteeing the right to arms.”) (second alteration in original), and 
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 480 
(1995) (“[F]elons, children, and the insane were excluded from the right to arms precisely as (and for 
the same reasons) they were excluded from the franchise.”). For a compelling argument as to why the 
mentally ill do have a fundamental right to keep and bear arms, see Vars & Young, supra note 139, at 
7, 23 (arguing that the most persuasive reading of Heller is that it did not stand for the proposition that 
the mentally ill fall outside the scope of the Second Amendment and proposing three different types of 
scrutiny for any law implicating Second Amendment rights of the mentally ill).  
 175 Chester I, 628 F.3d at 683. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that because the right to 
keep and bear arms is fundamental, strict scrutiny should automatically apply. Id. at 682–83. The 
court explained that like challenges in the First Amendment context, the court does not always apply 
strict scrutiny whenever a fundamental right is involved; instead, the level of scrutiny applied “de-
pends on the nature of the conduct being regulated and the degree to which the challenged law bur-
dens the right.” Id. at 682. Here, the plaintiff’s claim did not fall within the “core” of the Second 
Amendment right—which the Fourth Circuit described as “the right of a law-abiding, responsible 
citizen to possess and carry a weapon for self-defense”—because the plaintiff was not a law-abiding 
citizen, given his misdemeanor. Id. at 683. 
 176 Id. at 683.The court observed that although the government had offered numerous reasons 
why the prohibition of firearm possession by domestic violence misdemeanants was substantially 
related to an important government interest, it had not offered sufficient evidence to justify the burden 
on the right. Id. On remand, the district court found that the government had met its burden; the 
Fourth Circuit affirmed on appeal. United States v. Chester (Chester II), 514 F. App’x 393, 395 (4th 
Cir. 2013). The government met its burden in Chester II because it established the following: (1) do-
mestic violence is a serious problem in the United States; (2) the rate of recidivism among domestic 
violence misdemeanants is substantial; (3) the use of firearms in connection with domestic violence is 
all too common; (4) the use of firearms in connection with domestic violence increases the risk of 
injury or homicide during a domestic violence incident; and (5) the use of firearms in connection with 
domestic violence often leads to injury or homicide. Id. (citing Staten, 666 F.3d at 167). 
 177 See, e.g., Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1137–41 (concluding at Step One that the government had not 
met its burden of showing that, as a historical matter, persons with domestic violence convictions 
were outside the Second Amendment right, and upholding § 922(g)(9) at Step Two); Staten, 666 F.3d 
at 160 (assuming that domestic violence misdemeanant’s Second Amendment rights were intact, but 
upholding § 922(g)(9) under intermediate scrutiny); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 651 (7th 
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In 2010, in United States v. Reese, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit considered an as-applied challenge to the federal law prohibiting fire-
arm possession by individuals subject to a restraining order.178 At Step One, 
the court concluded that the individual subject to a restraining order had Sec-
ond Amendment rights and that the law implicated those rights.179 At Step 
Two, the court selected intermediate scrutiny as the proper level of scrutiny 
and upheld the government’s prosecution under the law.180 Reese’s determina-
tion that individuals subject to a restraining order have Second Amendment 
rights has not been completely adopted by other circuits that have considered 
similar challenges to the statute.181 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, most courts that have considered Second 
Amendment challenges to regulations that fall squarely within Heller’s “pre-
sumptively lawful” list of measures—such as those regulations prohibiting 
possession of firearms by felons or the mentally ill—have disposed of the peti-
tioners’ claims with a citation to the Heller language.182 In 2016, however, in 
Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Department, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit reached a different conclusion.183 The petitioner, who had 
been adjudicated mentally ill as a result of a “brief depressive episode” thirty 
years prior to the litigation, brought a Second Amendment challenge to the 
federal statute that prohibits those found mentally ill from possessing fire-
arms.184 The Sixth Circuit chided the district court for incorrectly “under-
stand[ing] Heller’s pronouncement about ‘presumptively lawful’ prohibitions to 
insulate § 922(g)(4) from constitutional scrutiny.”185 At Step One, the Sixth Cir-
                                                                                                                           
Cir. 2010) (Sykes, J., dissenting) (pointing out that because the majority upheld § 922(g)(9) under 
means-end scrutiny at Step Two, it must have concluded that the convicted misdemeanant had Second 
Amendment rights that were implicated by the regulation). 
 178 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8); Reese, 627 F.3d at 800. 
 179 See Reese, 627 F.3d at 801 (“Applying that approach here, there is little doubt that the chal-
lenged law, § 922(g)(8), imposes a burden on conduct, i.e., Reese’s possession of otherwise legal 
firearms, that generally falls within the scope of the right guaranteed by the Second Amendment.”). 
 180 Id. at 802, 805. 
 181 See, e.g., United States v. Mahin, 668 F.3d 119, 124 (4th Cir. 2012) (declining at Step One to 
decide whether an individual subject to a restraining order has Second Amendment rights, yet still 
proceeding to Step Two and upholding § 922(g)(8) under intermediate scrutiny); Bena, 664 F.3d at 
1184 (implying that those subject to a restraining order fall outside the Second Amendment’s scope 
and upholding § 922(g)(8)). 
 182 See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 133, at 218–19 (collecting cases). 
 183 Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 699. 
 184 Id. at 683–84, 688. Under the federal provision, once an individual has been formally adjudicated 
mentally ill, he or she is permanently prohibited from possessing a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4); Cath-
erine Dowie, Comment, Constitutional Law—Impact of Involuntary Commitment and Mental Illness 
on Second Amendment Rights—Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016), 
13 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 275, 275 (2018). An individual may apply for relief from the permanent 
ban. See Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 682, 697 (noting that Congress has conditioned certain federal funds for 
states that facilitate the restoration of gun rights among those who fell within § 922(g)(4)’s bar). 
 185 Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 681. 
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cuit concluded that individuals who have been adjudicated mentally ill “are not 
categorically unprotected by the Second Amendment.”186 At Step Two, it applied 
intermediate scrutiny and held that the government had not met its burden of 
establishing a reasonable fit between its important interest of reducing crime and 
the regulation’s disarmament of anyone ever adjudicated mentally ill.187 
In sum, there are several key trends in the federal circuits’ Second 
Amendment jurisprudence when analyzing challenges to regulations resem-
bling Heller’s “presumptively lawful” exceptions.188 First, courts are increas-
ingly finding—or, at least, assuming—that individuals society has deemed 
dangerous—such as drug users, domestic violence misdemeanants, and those 
subject to a restraining order—have a right to keep and bear arms that is pro-
tected by the Second Amendment.189 To that end, the “safe harbor” approach 
exemplified by the Dugan and White courts seems to be increasingly disfa-
vored.190 Second, having either found or assumed a Second Amendment right 
is implicated by the regulation at Step One, courts almost always proceed to 
apply intermediate scrutiny at Step Two.191 
                                                                                                                           
 186 Id. at 690. The court observed that, given the inconclusive evidence surrounding whether Hel-
ler’s presumptively lawful measures were actually longstanding and accepted at the time of the Con-
stitution’s ratification, it would be “peculiar to conclude that § 922(g)(4) does not burden conduct 
within the ambit of the Second Amendment as historically understood based on nothing more than 
Heller’s observation that such a regulation is ‘presumptively lawful.’” Id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 
627 n.26). 
 187 Id. at 699. The district court has not yet issued a ruling on the case on remand. 
 188 See supra notes 164–181 and accompanying text. 
 189 See, e.g., Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1137; Mahin, 668 F.3d at 124; Staten, 666 F.3d at 160; Chester 
I, 628 F.3d at 680–81; Reese, 627 F.3d at 801. The Sixth Circuit has effectively found that the mental-
ly ill have a right to bear arms protected by the Second Amendment, constrained as it may be. See 
Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 690. 
 190 See Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 692 (calling the approach an “analytical off-ramp” and excuse not to 
do a constitutional analysis); Chester I, 628 F.3d at 682–83 (claiming the approach approximates 
rational basis review). 
 191 See, e.g., Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 692 (applying intermediate scrutiny); Chovan, 735 F.3d at 
1137–38 (same); Mahin, 668 F.3d at 124 (same); Staten, 666 F.3d at 159 (same); Chester I, 628 F.3d 
at 682–83 (same); Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641–42 (requiring “some form of strong showing” approximat-
ing intermediate scrutiny). Courts generally do not apply strict scrutiny to these cases because, as their 
reasoning goes, though the general Second Amendment right is implicated, the “core” of the right—
that of a law-abiding citizen to keep and bear arms for self-defense in the home—is not implicated 
because the petitioners have proven themselves to be non-law-abiding. See Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 691 
(“To hold, as Tyler requests, that he is at the core of the Second Amendment despite his history of 
mental illness would cut too hard against Congress’s power to categorically prohibit certain presump-
tively dangerous people from gun ownership.”). A critic of applying different scrutiny based on how 
close to the “core” of the right the regulated conduct or person is might argue that this resembles the 
sort of “interest-balancing” rejected by Heller. See Brief for the States of Texas et al. as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Petitioner at 2, Mance v. Whitaker, petition for cert. filed, No. 18-663 (U.S. Dec. 21, 
2018) (arguing that appellate courts are functionally applying the type of interest-balancing test that 
Heller rejected). In response, courts typically draw an analogy to First Amendment jurisprudence, 
where—despite the presence of a fundamental right—the level of scrutiny applied depends on the 
nature of the conduct being regulated and the degree to which the challenged law burdens the right. 
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B. State Courts’ Treatment of Second Amendment  
Challenges to Red Flag Laws 
In late July of 2012, a man approached a parking garage officer and told 
the officer he had found a dead body behind a gun range located on his proper-
ty—and that he himself might have been the killer.192 The man, Robert Reding-
ton, also informed the officer that he sees “dark spirits and dark entities,” that 
his firearms made him feel “courageous,” and that he came to Bloomington, 
Indiana to avenge Lauren Spierer, a college student who had gone missing.193 
A week later, the parking officer observed Redington on the third floor of the 
garage looking through binoculars down onto the street below and called law 
enforcement.194 After making contact with Redington and interviewing him at 
the police station, law enforcement searched Redington’s residence and seized 
forty-eight firearms.195 Following a trial judge’s order granting the state’s peti-
tion to retain Redington’s firearms for a year, Redington on appeal brought an 
as-applied challenge to Indiana’s red flag law, arguing that it violated his right 
to keep and bear arms under the Indiana state constitution’s Second Amend-
ment analogue.196 
                                                                                                                           
See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 
185, 198 (5th Cir. 2012) (“First Amendment doctrine demonstrates that, even with respect to a fun-
damental constitutional right, we can and should adjust the level of scrutiny according to the severity 
of the challenged regulation.”); Chester I, 628 F.3d at 682 (citing laws regulating commercial speech 
as an example). Critics respond by arguing the First Amendment “content neutral” laws that trigger 
less exacting scrutiny are more similar to gun laws regulating type of weapons and methods of carry—
which could arguably get intermediate scrutiny—than they are to laws that completely deny the fun-
damental right—which should always get strict scrutiny. See SWEARER, supra note 117, at 2 n.19. 
 192 Redington v. State (Redington I), 992 N.E.2d 823, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 
 193 Id. at 825–26. The parking officer’s manager told him to call law enforcement if he noticed 
Redington in the parking garage again. Id. at 825. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. at 825–27. When law enforcement first contacted Redington in the parking garage, they 
recovered two loaded handguns and a shotgun. Id. at 826. During an interview, Redington appeared 
delusional and was transported to a local hospital for a mental evaluation. Id. at 827. A licensed psy-
chiatrist evaluated Redington; he was then treated and released. Id. at 827, 840. That same day, law 
enforcement obtained warrants pursuant to IND. CODE § 35-47-14-2 to retain the three guns already 
seized and to search Redington’s residence. Id. The state then filed a petition for a full hearing to 
determine whether it could retain Redington’s firearms for a full year. Id. at 827–28. 
 196 Id. at 828. Indiana’s constitution states: “The people shall have a right to bear arms, for the 
defense of themselves and the State.” IND. CONST. art. 1, § 32. Despite the fact that McDonald incor-
porated the Second Amendment against the states, Redington did not argue the law violated his Sec-
ond Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 
(2010) (plurality opinion); Redington I, 992 N.E.2d at 830. Redington has since filed a successful 
petition under IND. CODE § 35-47-14-8 for return of his firearms. See Redington v. State (Redington 
II), 121 N.E.3d 1053, 1057, 1066 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (reversing the trial court’s denial of Reding-
ton’s petition and ordering his firearms to be returned). 
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In upholding Indiana’s red flag law, the Indiana Appeals Court did not 
deploy the two-step test adopted by the federal circuits.197 Instead, it an-
nounced a different test: first, it evaluates the law under some sort of means-
end scrutiny; second, if the law passes constitutional muster under the first 
step, the court then must determine if the law imposes a material burden on the 
exercise of the right.198 This second step can be broken into three distinct in-
quiries: (1) does the law implicate the “core value” of the right to keep and 
bear arms; (2) if so, does the law impose a “substantial obstacle” on the exer-
cise of that core value; and (3) even if the law does impose a substantial obsta-
cle, does the petitioner’s exercise of the right threaten a “particularized harm” 
to another party.199 
The court began by evaluating the law under rational basis review, and 
upheld it as rationally calculated to advance the state’s interest in seizing fire-
arms from dangerous persons.200 Moving on to the second step, the court as-
sumed the law did implicate the core value of Redington’s right to keep and 
bear arms.201 But the court then found that the law did not impose a substantial 
obstacle on that right, and, even if it did, Redington’s exercise of the right 
threatened “particularized harm” to other parties.202 
In 2016, in Hope v. State, the Appellate Court of Connecticut considered a 
similar challenge to Connecticut’s red flag law that was brought under the 
Second Amendment instead of a state constitution analogue.203 The case 
                                                                                                                           
 197 See Redington I, 992 N.E.2d at 833 (applying rational basis review and “material burden” 
test). This was likely because Redington’s claim was brought under the state constitution rather than 
the U.S. Constitution. See Wilder v. State, 91 N.E.3d 1016, 1027 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (explaining that 
Indiana courts analyze claims made under Article 1, § 32 of the state constitution differently from 
claims made under Second Amendment). 
 198 Redington I, 992 N.E.2d at 833–34. 
 199 Id. The core value embodied by Article 1, § 32 is the right of law-abiding citizens to keep 
arms for self-defense. Id. at 833. No matter the court’s answer to the first two inquiries, the petition-
er’s claim fails if his exercise of the right threatens a “particularized harm” to another party. Id. 
 200 Id. at 833. The court dedicated just one sentence to its analysis under rational basis review. Id. 
The court cited Heller and McDonald in this part of its opinion, alluding to those opinions’ language 
that laws regulating the possession of firearms by the mentally ill are “presumptively lawful.” Id. It 
did not address Heller’s rejection of rational basis review as an inappropriate level of scrutiny. See id.; 
see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27. In a Second Amendment challenge to a separate Indiana law 
that prohibits individuals on probation from possessing firearms, the Indiana Court of Appeals pro-
ceeded to evaluate the law under the two-part test used in the federal circuits. Wilder, 91 N.E.3d at 
1025. The court upheld that law under intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 1026. 
 201 Redington I, 992 N.E.2d at 833. The court did not engage in the question of whether the men-
tally ill or those exhibiting symptoms consistent with a mental illness even had rights protected by 
Article 1, § 32 of Indiana’s constitution. See id. (assuming Redington’s right to keep and bear arms 
remained intact). 
 202 Id. at 834–35. The court pointed to the law’s mechanism allowing for Redington to regain 
possession of his firearms on appeal after 180 days to support its conclusion that the law did not im-
pose a “substantial obstacle.” Id. at 834. 
 203 133 A.3d 519, 524 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016). The plaintiff did not claim the law violated his right 
to bear arms under Connecticut’s constitution. Id. at 522 n.1. 
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stemmed from an incident which occurred on May 15, 2014, when the peti-
tioner called law enforcement to his residence to investigate a possible burgla-
ry.204 Though law enforcement found no evidence of a break-in, the petitioner 
continued to insist to officers that he heard voices coming from the basement 
and that unnamed individuals were trying to hack into his electronic devices.205 
That evening, law enforcement searched the petitioner’s residence and, against 
his will, confiscated his firearms and transported him to a hospital for a psy-
chiatric evaluation.206 The petitioner appealed after a superior court judge 
granted the state’s petition to retain the firearms for a year.207 
The Hope court began its analysis by noting that Heller and McDonald 
recognized that legislatures may use a variety of “presumptively lawful” 
measures to prevent gun violence.208 It then went on to announce the two-step 
test used by federal courts in analyzing Second Amendment claims.209 The 
court proceeded to uphold the law at Step One, concluding that it does not im-
plicate the Second Amendment because it does not restrict the right of law-
abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of their home.210 Implicit 
in the court’s reasoning was that an individual like the petitioner—who had 
never been adjudicated mentally ill or convicted of a felony but who was ex-
hibiting delusional behavior and in the possession of firearms—did not have a 
right to keep and bear arms protected by the Second Amendment because he 
was not a law-abiding citizen.211 The court then concluded by calling the law 
an example of the “presumptively lawful” measures contemplated by Heller.212 
                                                                                                                           
 204 Id. at 522. 
 205 Id. at 522–23. Law enforcement also spoke to the plaintiff’s wife, who said her husband had 
become increasingly delusional and had been holding a rifle when she arrived home that evening. Id. 
 206 Id. at 523. 
 207 Id. Law enforcement seized the plaintiff’s firearms before filing for a temporary risk warrant. 
See id. The judge found by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff posed an imminent risk of 
physical harm to himself or others, as he suffered from a paranoia that had not been completely treat-
ed. Id. 
 208 Id. at 524. 
 209 See id. (citing State v. DeCiccio, 105 A.3d 165, 187 (Conn. 2014) for its layout of the two-step 
test and its acknowledgement that rational basis review is an inappropriate level of means-end scrutiny 
at Step Two). The court noted that the limited amount of time the state may legally retain plaintiff’s 
firearms, the process afforded, and the limited class of people to which the law applies (those whom a 
court has adjudged to pose a risk of imminent physical harm to themselves or others) were ancillary 
considerations in favor of the law’s constitutionality. Id. 
 210 Id. The Hope court, having determined the law did not implicate conduct or persons protected 
by the Second Amendment, did not apply means-end scrutiny at Step Two. Id. 
 211 See id. (identifying the right protected by the Second Amendment as that of law-abiding citi-
zens to use arms for self-defense in the home and stating that such a right was not implicated in the 
instant case). For support, the Hope court noted the observation of a California appeals court that 
Heller did not extend Second Amendment protections to persons whose firearms were seized because 
they were found to be a danger to themselves due to their mental health. Id. at 525 (citing City of San 
Diego v. Boggess, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644, 652 (Ct. App. 2013)). In reaching this conclusion, the court 
foreclosed the possibility of finding that although the plaintiff had Second Amendment rights, the 
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IV. HOW COURTS SHOULD ANALYZE SECOND AMENDMENT  
CHALLENGES TO RED FLAG LAWS 
Courts have clearly struggled to develop a uniform consensus on how to 
evaluate Second Amendment challenges to laws that either (1) fall directly into 
Heller’s list of “presumptively lawful” measures, or (2) are unlisted but re-
semble those measures.213 Red flag laws are arguably among the latter 
group.214 Due to the speed at which some states enacted their red flag laws, the 
controversial nature of the laws, and law enforcement officials’ increased reli-
ance on the laws to seize firearms from individuals they deem dangerous, it is 
likely that the laws will continue to be challenged in court.215 This Part argues 
                                                                                                                           
burden imposed on the right was either not significant enough to present a constitutional issue or was 
sufficiently justified to pass constitutional muster. Compare Redington I, 992 N.E.2d at 831–35 (as-
suming the right was implicated and then considering the significance of the burden), with Hope, 133 
A.3d at 524–25 (resolving the case at Step One).  
 212 Hope, 133 A.3d at 524–25. 
 213 Compare United States v. Dugan, 657 F.3d 998, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2011) (resolving a chal-
lenge to federal prohibition on possession of firearms by drug users at Step One), and United States v. 
White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) (resolving a challenge to federal prohibition on posses-
sion of firearms by domestic violence misdemeanants at Step One), with United States v. Chester 
(Chester I), 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010) (resolving a challenge to federal prohibition on posses-
sion of firearms by domestic violence misdemeanants at Step Two), and United States v. Reese, 627 
F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010) (resolving a challenge to federal prohibition on possession of fire-
arms by individuals subject to a restraining order at Step Two), and Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s 
Dep’t (Tyler II), 837 F.3d 678, 690 (6th Cir. 2016) (resolving challenge to federal prohibition on pos-
session of firearms by mentally ill at Step Two). 
 214 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 790.401(3) (2018) (applying to anyone found to pose a “significant 
danger of causing personal injury to himself or others by having in his or her custody or control, or by 
purchasing, possessing, or receiving, a firearm,” and listing evidence of “recurring mental health is-
sues”—notably, not an adjudication of mental illness or an involuntary commitment—as one of fif-
teen different criteria a judge may consider in determining whether to grant the order). Unlike 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 922(g)(4), red flag laws do not apply only to felons or those adjudicated to 
be mentally ill or involuntarily committed. Compare 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.3-5 (2018) (listing “crim-
inal history” and “mental health history” as two out of eleven factors a judge might consider in deter-
mining whether grounds for an extreme risk protection order exist), with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2018) 
(conditioning prohibition of firearm possession on a formal adjudication of a mental illness or an 
involuntary commitment). 
 215 See, e.g., Amended Initial Brief of Appellant, supra note 22, at 1–2 (arguing that Florida’s red 
flag law is problematic partly because it was hastily implemented and gave those involved in the crim-
inal justice system little time to prepare for how to uniformly apply the statute); Colin Campbell, Anne 
Arundel Police Say Officers Fatally Shot Armed Man While Serving Protective Order to Remove 
Guns, BALT. SUN (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-aa-
shooting-20181105-story.html [https://perma.cc/SE8Q-M74P] (detailing how police fatally shot a 
man in Maryland while serving a risk protection order, stirring controversy); see also Johnson, supra 
note 23 (describing a lawsuit brought in Nevada arguing that the state’s red flag law violates the fed-
eral and Nevada constitutions’ right to a jury trial); Dave Soloman, Both Sides Brace for Battle Over 
‘Red Flag’ Law Today in House, N.H. UNION-LEADER (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.unionleader.com/
news/politics/both-sides-brace-for-battle-over-red-flag-law-today/article_ed375c77-964c-5254-9807-
98500b3a2849.html [https://perma.cc/CMG8-PPML] (detailing strong opposition to proposed red flag 
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that courts should proceed with the analysis of a Second Amendment challenge 
to a red flag law by finding that the laws regulate conduct and individuals pro-
tected by the Second Amendment at Step One, and then evaluate the law under 
intermediate scrutiny at Step Two.216 
In reviewing a Second Amendment challenge to a red flag law, it is likely 
that some courts will resolve the dispute at Step One by concluding that the 
regulated conduct falls outside the ambit of the Second Amendment, or that the 
regulated person lacks Second Amendment rights, and uphold the law as con-
stitutional.217 Indeed, the Hope court followed just this line of reasoning in re-
jecting a Second Amendment challenge to Connecticut’s red flag law.218 The 
Fourth Circuit referred to this type of reasoning as the “safe harbor” approach 
while the Sixth Circuit characterized it as a court taking an “analytical off-
ramp.”219 It is an unsatisfactory approach for a number of reasons.220 
First, prohibitions on possession of firearms by individuals included in 
Heller’s presumptively lawful list—for example, the mentally ill—were prac-
tically nonexistent at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification and 
                                                                                                                           
law in New Hampshire legislature); supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing law enforce-
ment’s increased reliance on red flag laws in Florida and Maryland). 
 216 See infra notes 217–247 and accompanying text. 
 217 See Binderup v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 360 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Hardiman, 
J., concurring) (explaining that respondents’ as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) should fail at Step 
One because—as misdemeanants whose punishments were large enough to qualify them as felons—
respondents did not have Second Amendment rights); Dugan, 657 F.3d at 999–1000 (resolving a 
challenge to federal prohibition on possession of firearms by drug users at Step One); United States v. 
Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 925 (8th Cir. 2010) (resolving challenge to federal prohibition on possession of 
firearms by drug users at Step One); White, 593 F.3d at 1206 (resolving a challenge to federal prohibi-
tion on possession of firearms by domestic violence misdemeanants at Step One); United States v. 
Richard, 350 F. App’x 252, 260 (10th Cir. 2009) (responding to prohibition challenge from drug users 
at Step One); Hope v. State, 133 A.3d 519, 525 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016) (concluding that Connecticut’s 
red flag law does not implicate the Second Amendment at Step One because it applies to non-law-
abiding individuals who don’t have Second Amendment rights). Some scholars support these courts’ 
decisions. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment 
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 413 (2009) (“Heller categorically excludes certain types of ‘people’ 
and ‘Arms’ from Second Amendment coverage, denying them any constitutional protection whatsoev-
er.”); Racine, supra note 139, at 623 (asserting that “the Second Amendment individual right to bear 
arms does not encompass felons or the mentally ill”). But see Vars & Young, supra note 139, at 4 (argu-
ing that Heller does not disqualify the mentally ill—or any class of individuals—from the right to bear 
arms). 
 218 See Hope, 133 A.3d at 525 (reasoning that non-law-abiding individuals don’t have Second 
Amendment rights and upholding Connecticut’s red flag law in the face of a Second Amendment 
challenge). In addition, the Appeals Court of California followed this same line of reasoning in re-
viewing a Second Amendment challenge to a statute that authorizes law enforcement to seize and 
retain firearms belonging to individuals detained for medical examination under the state’s involun-
tary civil commitment statute. City of San Diego v. Boggess, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644, 653–54 (Ct. App. 
2013). 
 219 Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 686; Chester I, 628 F.3d at 679. 
 220 See infra notes 221–239 and accompanying text. 
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therefore are not “longstanding” relative to the Constitutional Convention.221 
To the extent courts are true to the inquiry to be conducted at Step One, the 
absence of any such laws in 1791 prohibiting persons deemed mentally unsta-
ble by society from possessing firearms is a strong indication that such persons 
were thought to have Second Amendment rights.222 Moreover, the Heller ma-
jority repeatedly implied that the Second Amendment applies to all citizens, 
not just the subset of citizens deemed responsible or law-abiding.223 In sum, 
the lack of clear historical evidence showing the existence of laws categorical-
ly prohibiting individuals deemed mentally ill by society from possessing fire-
arms should cut in favor of the notion that these individuals do have Second 
Amendment rights, however limited, and that any law infringing upon that 
right must withstand some type of means-end scrutiny.224 
                                                                                                                           
 221 See Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 690 (characterizing the historical evidence of laws prohibiting pos-
session of firearms by the mentally unstable as ambiguous at best); Larson, supra note 139, at 1374–
78 (concluding that no government had laws prohibiting felons, the mentally ill, or other individuals 
deemed dangerous from possessing firearms until the twentieth century). One scholar observed, 
One thing the Founders did not do was impose any gun control laws obviously equiva-
lent to those on the laundry list. They had no restrictions on the commercial sales of 
firearms as such . . . . Nor did the Founders have bans on guns in schools, government 
buildings, or any other “sensitive place.” The Founding generation had no laws limiting 
gun possession by the mentally ill, nor laws denying the right to people convicted of 
crimes. Bans on ex-felons possessing firearms were first adopted in the 1920s and 
1930s, almost a century and a half after the Founding. 
Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1563 (2009). 
 222 See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 133, at 244 (arguing that there is no historical support for 
the proposition that individuals subject to modern categorical bans on firearm possession have no 
Second Amendment rights); Vars & Young, supra note 139, at 7 (arguing that the mentally ill have 
Second Amendment rights because prohibitions on possession of firearms by mentally ill are not 
longstanding); Winkler, supra note 221, at 1563 n.67 (arguing that governments can lawfully ban 
felons and the mentally ill from possessing guns, not because those individuals lack Second Amend-
ment protection, but because the government has sufficiently compelling reasons for doing so). 
 223 Vars & Young, supra note 139, at 4–5. The Heller Court repeatedly stated that the Second 
Amendment applies to all citizens. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580–81, 583 
(2008) (stating the strong presumption that the Second Amendment right is “exercised individually 
and belongs to all Americans” and observing that the term “the people” in the Constitution and Bill of 
Rights refers to all citizens, not just a subset). While the Court did imply that the “core” of the right 
was that of law-abiding citizens to keep and bear arms for self-defense in the home, nothing in its 
opinion held that the “core” of the right represents the outer bounds of the protection the right affords, 
or that some classes of individuals have no Second Amendment rights. See id. at 614, 628–29, 635; 
Rosenthal, supra note 139, at 2 (observing that the only clear boundary on Second Amendment rights 
to emerge from Heller is that the right to keep and bear arms “does not protect those weapons not 
typically possessed by law abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns,” or 
otherwise “dangerous and unusual weapons”). 
 224 See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 133, at 244 (arguing that there is no historical support for the 
proposition that individuals subject to modern bans on firearm possession have no Second Amendment 
rights); Vars & Young, supra note 139, at 7 (arguing the mentally ill have Second Amendment rights 
because prohibitions on possession of firearms by mentally ill are not longstanding). 
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Second, the “safe harbor” approach has the effect of reading the word “pre-
sumptively” out of the Heller opinion.225 Heller stated that the listed measures 
were “presumptively lawful,” not conclusively lawful.226 Presumptions ought to 
be rebuttable.227 In effect, Heller’s “presumption” amounts to a judicial best-
guess that these types of laws are supported by sufficiently weighty interests and 
appropriately tailored to carry out that interest.228 But the “presumption” itself 
should have no analytical role to play in the constitutional analysis.229 Indeed, 
courts that resolve the challenge at Step One necessarily deprive the challenging 
party of the opportunity to rebut Heller’s presumption that the measures are law-
ful.230 Moreover, as the Third Circuit noted in Marzzarella, to treat Heller’s pre-
sumptions as irrebuttable would negate the Second Amendment.231 
Third, the “safe harbor” approach will present problems for courts evalu-
ating as-applied challenges to red flag laws brought under the Second Amend-
ment.232 As an initial matter, if a court adopts the view that potentially danger-
                                                                                                                           
 225 Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 133, at 216; Vars & Young, supra note 139, at 7. 
 226 554 U.S. at 627 n.26. 
 227 See United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Heller referred to felon dis-
armament bans only as ‘presumptively lawful,’ which, by implication, means that there must exist the 
possibility that the ban could be unconstitutional in the face of an as-applied challenge.”); Presumption, 
CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/presumption [https://
perma.cc/25DN-ENJU] (defining presumption as “a belief that something is true because it is likely, 
although not certain”); Presumption, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, https://www.macmillandictionary.
com/us/dictionary/american/presumption [https://perma.cc/Q29U-6XTB] (“[T]he belief that some-
thing is true because no one has proved that it is not.”). 
 228 See Binderup, 836 F.3d at 360 n.6 (Hardiman, J., concurring) (“To so hold would ignore the 
meaning of the word ‘presumption.’ A presumption of constitutionality ‘is a presumption . . . [about] 
the existence of factual conditions supporting the legislation. As such it is a rebuttable presump-
tion.’”) (alterations in original). 
 229 See Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 686 (criticizing the safe harbor approach as an “analytical off-ramp”); 
Chester I, 628 F.3d at 679 (same). 
 230 See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that if the plaintiff 
fails at Step One, the challenged law passes constitutional muster and the inquiry is complete—
meaning the government is not required to show the challenged law satisfies the appropriate means-
end scrutiny). 
 231 Id. at 92 n.8. The Third Circuit reached this conclusion by reasoning that if all listed measures 
in Heller’s “presumptively lawful” dicta were lawful because they regulated conduct that fell outside 
the Second Amendment’s ambit, then any restriction on the commercial sale of firearms (one of the 
four listed measures in Heller’s dicta) would be acceptable. Id. It would then follow that a government 
could enact a complete ban on the commercial sale of firearms, which would be an unacceptable result 
under Heller. Id. 
 232 See Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 991 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (expressing hesitation to find that 
the plaintiff—whose conviction was forty years prior, received no jail time, and served honorably in 
the Vietnam War—was outside the ambit of the Second Amendment simply because he was a felon); 
see also United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The Heller Court’s holding 
that defines the core right to bear arms by law-abiding, responsible citizens does not preclude some future 
determination that persons who commit some offenses might nonetheless remain in the protected class of 
‘law-abiding, responsible’ persons.”). The Schrader court did not have to decide the “difficult” question 
of whether the plaintiff himself fell within the scope of the Second Amendment, because the plaintiff 
had not raised an as-applied challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 704 F.3d at 991. Nevertheless, it cast 
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ous people do not have Second Amendment rights and simply resolves the is-
sue at Step One, then no as-applied challenge to the laws brought by such an 
individual could ever be successful.233 Such reasoning surely goes too far and 
could preclude valid constitutional claims.234 In addition, operating on this as-
sumption in the context of red flag laws—that finding an individual to be dan-
gerous within the meaning of the pertinent red flag statute eliminates that indi-
vidual’s Second Amendment rights—paints with too wide a brush.235 For ex-
ample, could it really be that the petitioner in Davis v. Gilchrest County Sher-
iff’s Office was disqualified from protection under the Second Amendment 
simply because of his comment to the sheriff?236 How about Mr. Velasquez 
after his comment to law enforcement that if he was going to commit a school 
shooting, it would be at his middle school?237 Courts adopting the “safe har-
bor” approach could unnecessarily be forced to answer difficult questions at 
Step One about what level of dangerousness disqualifies an individual from the 
Second Amendment’s protections.238 Instead, courts should determine at Step 
                                                                                                                           
doubt on the idea that the plaintiff lacked Second Amendment rights merely because he was convicted 
of a felony in a bar fight forty years prior. Id. at 992.  
 233 See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89 (stating that if the plaintiff cannot pass Step One—that is, 
cannot show he falls with the Second Amendment’s ambit—the inquiry is over and no means-end 
scrutiny is necessary). 
 234 See Binderup, 836 F.3d at 366–67 (Hardiman, J., concurring) (“But to deny one even the op-
portunity to ‘develop [a] factual basis’ in support of his constitutional claim would run afoul of both 
Supreme Court guidance regarding the scope of the Second Amendment and the concept of an as-
applied challenge.”) (alteration in original); Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1137 (10th 
Cir. 2015) (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (arguing that the Tenth Circuit majority misinterpreted Hel-
ler’s “presumptively lawful” dicta to suggest that the Second Amendment right does not exist in gov-
ernment buildings). 
 235 See Bonidy, 790 F.3d at 1137 (Tymkovich, J., concurring). 
 236 Amended Initial Brief of Appellant, supra note 22, at 12; see supra notes 108–111 and ac-
companying text (describing the facts of Davis). Judge White of the Sixth Circuit has taken issue with 
what she calls this “on/off switch” approach to the Second Amendment—where someone can quickly 
lose or regain Second Amendment rights depending on their current mental health status—arguing it 
is less workable than applying means-end scrutiny to the law. Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 700–01 (White, J., 
concurring). Judge Barrett of the Seventh Circuit has echoed Judge White’s concern. Kanter v. Barr, 
919 F.3d 437, 452 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J. dissenting) (observing that an interpretation of the Sec-
ond Amendment which would lead to an individual being “in one day and out the next” is an unusual 
way to think about constitutional rights). 
 237 Torralva, supra note 6; see supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (detailing Mr. Velasquez’s 
interview with law enforcement). 
 238 See Binderup, 836 F.3d at 351 (plurality opinion) (applying a somewhat vague “civic virtue” 
standard at Step One to determine whether an individual has rights protected by the Second Amend-
ment); id. at 375–76 (Hardiman, J., concurring) (deploying a “dangerousness” standard as the touch-
stone at Step One—a standard apparently intended to be less rigorous than the “civic virtue” standard 
adopted by the plurality); Schrader, 704 F.3d at 991 (expressing hesitation to find that an aged and 
honorably discharged veteran plaintiff was outside the ambit of the Second Amendment simply be-
cause he committed a felony forty years ago). The Schrader court did not have to decide one way or the 
other because the plaintiff had not raised an as-applied challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 704 F.3d at 
991. In making the “level of dangerousness” determination within the context of red flag laws, trial 
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One that red flag laws in most cases do implicate the Second Amendment—
because Heller does not place potentially dangerous individuals outside the 
Amendment’s scope—and then proceed to apply intermediate scrutiny to the 
challenged law.239 
The appropriate level of scrutiny to apply in Second Amendment cases 
has generated much debate among legal scholars.240 Heller’s clearest dictate 
was that rational basis review would be an inappropriate level of review for a 
“specific, enumerated right” such as the right to keep and bear arms.241 Justice 
Scalia, writing for the majority, also appeared to reject Justice Breyer’s proposal 
for an “interest-balancing” test that would weigh the particular individual’s as-
serted right to keep and bear arms against the state’s need to provide for public 
safety.242 After Heller, most courts have adopted a hybrid that applies strict scru-
tiny when the regulated conduct is at the “core” of the Second Amendment—
that of law-abiding citizens to keep arms for self-defense in the home—and 
                                                                                                                           
courts generally must evaluate the future behavior of the defendant, which can be difficult. Greg Allen, 
Florida Could Serve as Example for Lawmakers Considering Red Flag Laws, NPR (Aug. 21, 2019), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/08/21/752815318/florida-could-serve-as-example-for-lawmakers-
considering-red-flag-laws [https://perma.cc/G26T-QLY7]. Regarding this difficulty, the Broward 
County circuit court chief judge said, “You’re trying to determine is [the defendant] going to harm 
himself or others and should he have a weapon or ammunition? And so it’s a decision you’re making 
based on future behavior, which isn’t one we do a lot in the court system.” Id. 
 239 See Kanter, 919 F.3d at 453 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (“Neither felons nor the mentally ill are 
categorically excluded from our national community . . . . Thus, I treat Kanter as falling within the 
scope of the Second Amendment and ask whether Congress and Wisconsin can nonetheless prevent 
him from possessing a gun.”); Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 690 (finding that those adjudicated mentally ill or 
involuntarily committed are not left unprotected by the Second Amendment); Reese, 627 F.3d at 801 
(holding that an individual subject to a restraining order had Second Amendment rights). 
 240 See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 241 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 n.27. 
 242 See id. at 634 (“We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection 
has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”). Justice Breyer’s proposed “in-
terest-balancing” test would require the Court to ask “whether the statute burdens a protected interest 
in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other important 
governmental interests.” Id. at 689–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, in the majority opinion, 
Justice Scalia seemed to extend an open invitation for courts to conduct such an “interest-balancing” 
inquiry by identifying the core of the right as that of the law-abiding citizen to keep arms for self-
defense in the home. See id. at 635 (majority opinion) (explaining that the Second Amendment “surely 
elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense 
of hearth and home”). Some courts have accepted the invitation, at least when the conduct involved 
does not represent the “core of the right,” and generally apply some version of an “interest-balancing” 
test which they label intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago, 846 F.3d 888, 892 (7th 
Cir. 2017). The Seventh Circuit noted, 
The rigor of this means-end review depends on “how close the law comes to the core of 
the Second Amendment right and the severity of the law’s burden on the right.” Severe 
burdens on the core right of armed defense require a very strong public-interest justifi-
cation and a close means-end fit; lesser burdens, and burdens on activity lying closer to 
the margins of the right, are more easily justified. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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intermediate scrutiny when the regulated conduct falls outside of the “core.”243 
This hybrid approach, though occasionally resembling the “interest-balancing” 
Justice Scalia rejected in Heller, is sensible in the context of red flag laws be-
cause it allows courts to balance the weight of the right against Heller’s cau-
tion that an individual may not “carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner 
whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”244 In addition, Justice Scalia implied 
that Justice Breyer’s “interest-balancing” approach was only inappropriate 
when the “core” of the Second Amendment’s protection was involved.245 
When law enforcement seeks to use a red flag law to seize an individual’s fire-
arms, the individual’s conduct generally does not fall within the “core” of the 
Second Amendment’s protection—the right of law abiding citizens to keep fire-
arms for self-defense in the home.246 Therefore, unless and until the Supreme 
Court clarifies its current Second Amendment jurisprudence, these cases should 
generally be evaluated under intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny.247 
                                                                                                                           
 243 See, e.g., Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 690, 692; Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 
953, 961 (9th Cir. 2014); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & 
Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2012); Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1257 
(D.C. Cir. 2011); Chester I, 628 F.3d at 680; see also SARAH PECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44618, 
POST-HELLER SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 16–17 (2019) (explaining that most courts apply 
either intermediate or strict scrutiny depending on how great a burden the law puts on the right). 
 244 See 554 U.S. at 626 (observing that “[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second 
Amendment is not unlimited”); Calvin Massey, Guns, Extremists, and the Constitution, 57 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1095, 1137 (2000) (arguing that the hybrid approach strikes an appropriate balance be-
tween protecting the individual right and preserving the state’s interest in enacting public safety laws). 
 245 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634 (“We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose 
core protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”) (emphasis add-
ed). 
 246 See, e.g., Amended Initial Brief of Appellant, supra note 22, at 2–6 (explaining how petitioner 
threatened to shoot a fellow co-worker while enraged about his co-worker’s relationship with petition-
er’s girlfriend); Berman, supra note 3 (detailing how Nikolas Cruz stated he wanted to commit a 
school shooting, among other violent acts); Torralva, supra note 6 (explaining how Christian Ve-
lasquez told police he might commit a school shooting). But see Lipscomb, supra note 19 (telling the 
story of a man who, though likely delusional, did not make any explicit threats and did not carry his 
firearm outside his home). 
 247 See Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 690–91 (holding that although the Second Amendment applied to 
Tyler, he was not at the “core” of its protections because he had a history of mental illness); Brannon 
P. Denning, The New Doctrinalism in Constitutional Scholarship and District of Columbia v. Heller, 
75 TENN. L. REV. 789, 799 (2008) (arguing that intermediate scrutiny is the baseline standard for Sec-
ond Amendment cases); Massey, supra note 244, at 1137 (explaining why the hybrid approach strikes 
an appropriate balance between protecting the individual right and preserving the state’s interest in 
enacting public safety laws); Kiehl, supra note 240, at 1133 (“[C]ourts should apply intermediate 
scrutiny in evaluating gun regulations that are short of absolute bans on possession, and that prohibi-
tions on carrying weapons do not implicate the core constitutional right identified in Heller and 
McDonald of possessing a gun in the home for self-defense.”). The Supreme Court is currently con-
sidering its first Second Amendment case since McDonald. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Will Review 
New York City Gun Law, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/us/politics/
supreme-court-guns-nyc-license.html [https://perma.cc/4E3J-AQ7E]. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the face of increased gun violence and mass shootings, red flag laws 
have become a popular legislative tool among policymakers, commentators, 
and legal scholars for protecting public safety. The laws are gaining momen-
tum in state houses around the country because they provide law enforcement 
with a means to expeditiously remove firearms from potentially dangerous in-
dividuals—regardless of the individual’s criminal record and mental health 
history. Thus far, the laws have been a magnet for constitutional challenges—
many of which have been brought under the Second Amendment. In consider-
ing such challenges, courts should conclude that red flag laws do regulate indi-
viduals protected by the Second Amendment, and then proceed to apply inter-
mediate scrutiny. This should be the case despite the Supreme Court’s recent 
push to ensure that lower courts treat the right protected by the Second 
Amendment as equivalent to those protected by other amendments in the Bill 
of Rights. Though red flag laws often do infringe upon an individual’s right to 
bear arms, they frequently regulate conduct that falls outside the core protec-
tion of the Second Amendment. For that reason, they generally will not merit 
strict scrutiny. Such an approach strikes a sensible balance between, on the one 
hand, allowing state legislatures to act to address a burgeoning public health 
concern, and, on the other hand, ensuring that citizens can vindicate their indi-
vidual rights and that the Second Amendment assumes its place as equal to 
other amendments in the Bill of Rights. 
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